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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nearly thirty years ago, the first of a series of bills to remove 
asbestos litigation from the tort system by creating an industry-funded 
mechanism to administratively pay asbestos claims was introduced into 
Congress.1  The need for a legislative resolution for asbestos litigation 
has long been manifest.2  After many unsuccessful efforts to resolve the 
asbestos litigation crisis, the Senate is poised to take up consideration of 
Senate Bill 852 (S. 852),3 the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution 
Act of 2005.  This essay is a preliminary effort to present some context 
for discussion of S. 852 and to estimate the costs that may be incurred 
for resolution of personal injury asbestos claims if S. 852 is enacted.  
To date, over 850,000 individual claimants have filed suit against 
over 8,400 manufacturers, distributors, installers, and sellers of 
asbestos-containing products distributed across most United States 
industries, as well as against owners of buildings and plants in which 
asbestos is present, claiming injury from exposure to asbestos, resulting 
in over seventy bankruptcies.4  Since each plaintiff sues approximately 
sixty to seventy different defendants and bankruptcy trusts, the total 
number of claims probably exceeds 50,000,000.5 
While nonmalignant claim filings substantially declined in 2004 
and continue to decline in 2005 from previous record levels,6 the latest 
estimates are that 1,000,000 new claimants will emerge over the next 
forty-five years.7 
Historically, approximately ten percent of asbestos claims have 
alleged malignancies, including mesothelioma, lung cancer, and “other 
 
 1 See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
 3 See Albert B. Crenshaw, Analysis Says Asbestos Plans Might Work, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 
2005, at D03. 
 4 Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 834-35 
(2005).  Most knowledgeable observers anticipate additional bankruptcy filings depending on 
whether proposed federal legislation (S. 852) is enacted and, if it is, what it provides with regard 
to mandatory payments to the Trust Fund.  
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Letter from Robert A. Falise, Chairman & Managing Trustee of the Manville Personal 
Injury Settlement Trust, to the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein and the Hon. Burton R. Lifland (July 29, 
2005) (accompanying the Trust’s financial statements and Report for the quarter ended June 30, 
2005 and describing actuarial analysis of future claim filings done by Tillinghast-Towers, Perrin, 
Foster, & Crosby, Inc.).  The Tillinghast projections assume that, although very few screenings to 
generate nonmalignant claims have taken place in 2004 and 2005, lawyers will resume 
sponsoring such screenings in future years, though not to the same degree as they have in the 
past.  See Trevar Withers, Remarks at the Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Asbestos Conference (Sept. 
29, 2005).  The validity of this assumption depends on the dollar values that emerging bankruptcy 
trusts will assign to nonmalignant asymptomatic claims and the outcome of the grand jury 
investigation that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York is currently 
conducting.  See infra  note 163. 
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cancers” (laryngeal, pharyngeal, esophageal, stomach, and colorectal 
cancers).8  While mesothelioma claim values have increased 
significantly in recent years, the number of future malignant claims is 
fairly predictable and is based on epidemiological data.9  Predictions of 
the number of future lung cancer and “other cancer” claims to be 
attributed to asbestos exposure are more problematic.  Deaths attributed 
to lung cancer exceed 150,000 annually;10 “other cancers” account for 
additional thousands of deaths annually.  However, asbestos exposure is 
a substantial contributing factor in only a small fraction of these 
cancers.  While issues of causation thus abound, historical tort system 
data can serve as a basis for projections.  No comparable 
epidemiological or tort system data exists, however, as a basis for 
predicting the number of nonmalignant claims.  Since the large majority 
of these claims purport to allege a “legal” injury that is not recognized 
by medical science as a disease or injury, medical science and 
epidemiology cannot inform predictions of the numbers of such claims.  
Nor does historical tort system experience provide reliable data because 
these claims are primarily a function of the development of an 
entrepreneurial model in which the profitability of the litigation 
determines the number of claims.  Profitability is a function of the cost 
of claim generation, which includes the costs of mass screenings and the 
production of medical evidence, mostly by a score of regularly-selected 
B-readers and litigation doctors, versus the income such claim filings 
generate in the form of settlements and, on rare occasions, verdicts.  
Under the prevailing entrepreneurial model, both the existence of actual 
injury and proof of substantial product exposure are often essentially 
irrelevant.  As a federal judge has noted, a “diagnosis” is “money in the 
bank” irrespective of its validity.11  The decrease in nonmalignant claim 
filings that began in 2004 is largely accounted for by a decrease in the 
profitability of entrepreneurially-generated nonmalignant claims. 
A number of factors account for the significant impetus behind 
current consideration of legislative proposals that range from limiting 
compensation available in the tort system to plaintiffs whose injuries 
meet specified medical criteria to the creation of an administrative 
alternative to asbestos litigation.  These factors include: the number of 
asbestos lawsuits; the almost $80 billion in costs already imposed on 
defendants and their insurers; the even larger sum projected for future 
 
 8 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 75 
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf [hereinafter 
RAND REPORT].  
 9 Id. at 141-45. 
 10 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Lung Cancer 
Statistics, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/lung/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
 11 In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1553, 2005 WL 1593936, at *53 (S.D. Tex. June 
30, 2005).   
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costs; the 500,000 jobs lost or not created because of the litigation; the 
further financial consequences of the litigation’s impact on capital 
markets; and concern for the integrity of the civil justice system as most 
recently voiced by a federal judge presiding over the silica multi-district 
litigation (MDL) proceeding, who found that B-readers, diagnosing 
doctors, screening companies, and lawyers had engaged in a scheme to 
manufacture diagnoses for money.12 
S. 852, which is now before the Senate, is the product of extended 
and extensive negotiation between a number of stakeholders, including, 
inter alia, businesses, insurers, labor unions, and lawyers.13  The bill 
proposes the creation of a $140 billion trust funded by businesses and 
insurers to pay claims that meet the medical criteria the bill sets out (the 
“Trust Fund”).  In this essay, I examine the financial costs, in addition 
to the $140 billion to be paid into the Trust Fund, which may be 
incurred to resolve current and future personal injury claims based upon 
asbestos exposure. 
In attempting to quantify the costs that “fixing” the asbestos 
litigation crisis may generate and, in particular, those costs additional to 
the Trust Fund, I am not advocating adoption or rejection of S. 852 or 
any other legislative “fix” of the massive civil justice system failure that 
I describe below.  Moreover, though I consider the costs that may be 
incurred in addition to the cost of the Trust Fund S. 852 will create if 
enacted, I am not expressing any view as to the likelihood of the bill’s 
passage. 
 Repair of this failure is underway in a number of states.14  It is 
clear, however, given the evidence of specious claiming that I 
summarize below and the conclusions drawn by U.S. District Court 
Judge Janis Jack in presiding over the silica MDL proceeding (which 
equate to a finding of massive fraud),15 that more needs to be done to 
curb the abuses of entrepreneurial claiming as well as the negative 
effects of asbestos litigation on capital markets and job creation. 
There are substantial benefits to be realized by adopting 
legislation to create an administrative mechanism in place of the tort 
system for resolution of asbestos claims.  First, an administrative 
mechanism can provide for substantially uniform compensation to 
similarly situated claimants, which would be more equitable and 
expedient than the lottery-like nature of asbestos litigation in the current 
tort system.16  An administrative mechanism would provide the added 
 
 12 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Crenshaw, supra note 3. 
 14 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.91-.98 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-41-1 
to 51-14-10 (West 2005). 
 15 See infra Section V.C.5. 
 16 See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A Need For An 
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benefit that those with injuries which merit substantial compensation 
such as mesothelioma will not be adversely affected by the insolvency 
of particular defendants as currently can occur in the tort system.17 
Second, adopting appropriate “medical/exposure criteria” could 
limit eligibility for compensation to only those claimants with actual 
injuries substantially caused by asbestos exposure.  Appropriate medical 
criteria could eliminate or severely limit compensation to the hundreds 
of thousands of mostly unimpaired claimants—claimants that are 
recruited by entrepreneurial screening programs and whose claims are 
supported by entrepreneurially-generated medical evidence and 
testimony—who have not suffered an injury recognized as such by 
medical science but who have received billions of dollars in settlements 
and judgments in the tort system.  Moreover, appropriate standards for 
the administration of pulmonary function tests could eliminate tens of 
thousands of lung impairment claims that are based on improper test 
administrations. 
Third, by adopting appropriate limitations on lawyers’ fees—S. 
852, for example, limits plaintiff lawyers’ fees to 5 percent18—
legislation could significantly reduce the intolerably high transaction 
costs associated with asbestos litigation in the tort system.  Currently, 
claimants realize less than forty-two cents of each dollar paid out by 
defendants and their insurers.19  Most of the remainder goes to pay 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers.20  In 2003, a consulting actuary for 
Tillinghast testified that, of the $130 billion it estimated in 2001 would 
be required for future asbestos claims, approximately $41 billion 
(31.5%) would go to plaintiffs’ attorneys21 and $28 billion (21.5%) 
would go to defense costs, leaving $61 billion (47%) of the $130 billion 
in projected future costs for claimants.22  Substantially eliminating these 
 
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1852 (1992).  
 17 Individuals whose asbestos exposure occurred while they served in the military during 
Word War II could realize a particular benefit.  See The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution 
Act: Hearing on S. 852 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of 
Hershel W. Gober, National Legislative Director, The Military Order of the Purple Heart).   
 18 S. 852, 109th Cong. § 104(e) (2005). 
 19 RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 104-05. 
 20 Id. at 87-106. 
 21 Plaintiffs’ lawyers charge contingency fees in asbestos litigation ranging from 25% to 50%.  
It appears that a plurality of contingency fees charged is 40%.  See Brickman, supra note 4, at 
841-42.  These contingency fees, as well as expenses charged to claimants, frequently violate 
ethical rules limiting fees and expenses to “reasonable amounts.”  Id. at 840-43.  However, 
asbestos litigation appears to be exempt from the application of ethical rules.  Id. at 837-39. 
 22 Solving the Asbestos Litigation Crisis: S. 1125, the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act of 
2003: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Jennifer 
L. Biggs, FCAS, MAAA, Consulting Actuary, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin).    
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transactional tort system costs could result in additional payments to 
claimants in the range of $60 billion. 
Fourth, legislation that would liquidate the costs of future 
asbestos-related liability at an appropriate level could provide a 
substantial benefit to the economy.  Substituting a final and visible 
outcome for the vagaries of the tort system would enable capital 
markets to accurately assess the costs to individual businesses and 
insurers, which could reduce the cost of capital for these business and 
insurers, leading to increased productivity and investment.23 
To set the stage for my analysis of the costs that may be incurred 
for resolution of personal injury asbestos claims if S. 852 is enacted, I 
first present a brief history of asbestos litigation, including the 
development of an entrepreneurial model of claim generation, followed 
by a brief summary of legislative efforts to deal with the asbestos 
litigation crisis.  I then briefly summarize S. 852’s legislative history 
and current content.  Finally, I consider the costs contributors to the 
Trust Fund may additionally have to bear to resolve personal injury 
asbestos claims. 
 
I.     A BRIEF HISTORY OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
 
Extensive exposure to asbestos, which was considered a magic 
mineral for more than a millennium because of its unique resistance to 
heat and a “strategic and critical mineral” essential to the war effort 
during World War II, has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths from 
cancer and asbestosis, a scarring of lung tissue.24  Beginning in the 
1960s, published research showed alarming rates of mesothelioma, a 
virulent cancer of the lining of the lung, among asbestos miners and 
 
 23 For discussion of the costs to society of asbestos litigation and, in particular, asbestos 
bankruptcies, see Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The 
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 37 n.10 (2003-04); Press 
Release, NERA Economic Consulting, Proposed Asbestos Trust Fund Legislation Would Save At 
Least $71 Billion; Boost US Competitiveness (Apr. 26, 2005) (describing the results of its study, 
commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers’ Asbestos Alliance, in which it 
estimated that asbestos litigation had cost $343 billion to date, stated that “[t]he productivity of 
the US manufacturing sector would be improved by eliminating the uncertainty and inefficiency 
of asbestos litigation,” and projected that “the stock market valuation of reform to defendant 
companies [from adoption of S. 852] is between $60 and $137 billion”).   
 24 RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.  RAND indicates that 81,790 mesothelioma deaths 
occurred through 2004, and that it anticipates an additional 50,770 through 2029; in addition, 
179,870 lung cancer deaths and 50,720 “other cancer” deaths occurred through 2004.  The lung 
cancer totals are controversial because while asbestos exposure significantly increases the risk to 
smokers of contracting lung cancer, proof of causation is often problematic.  Medical evidence 
controverts, in varying degree, claims that asbestos exposure causes “other cancers.”   
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asbestosis among insulation workers.25  The growing awareness of the 
risks and the corporate misdeeds led to a spate of lawsuits.  In 1973, the 
litigation underwent a significant change when the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals allowed workers injured by asbestos exposure, in addition to 
filing workers’ compensation claims against their employers, to file 
product liability lawsuits against manufacturers of the products used by 
industrial and construction workers.26 
In 1982, the Johns Manville Corporation, then the nation’s 
principal asbestos miner and fabricator of material containing asbestos, 
filed for bankruptcy in the face of about 16,000 pending claims.27  This 
turned out to be only the tip of the iceberg, however.  Under the impetus 
of judicial decisions that greatly expanded the amount of insurance 
assets that would be available to claimants, the litigation mushroomed.  
Moreover, while initially most asbestos litigation involved seriously 
injured claimants, by the mid-to-late 1980s, most of the lawsuits were 
being filed on behalf of claimants with little or no injury or proof of 
substantial exposure to products sold by the companies they were suing.  
My study of this litigation has led me to identify an entrepreneurial 
model of nonmalignant claim generation that began to emerge in the 
mid-to-late 1980’s to replace the traditional medical model of tort 
litigation in which a wrongfully injured person sees a doctor to treat his 
or her illness or injury and then seeks out a lawyer.  Under the 
entrepreneurial model,28 lawyers recruit plaintiffs, who are usually 
unaware of any injury and lack any symptoms or lung impairment, and 
send them to a small number of doctors chosen because they reliably 
produce diagnoses of and X-ray readings consistent with asbestos-
related injury. 
The elements of this entrepreneurial model29 include: 
(1) a massive client recruitment effort over the past fifteen to 
twenty years to “screen” over 750,000, and perhaps as many as 
1,000,000, former industrial and construction workers, which generated 
at least ninety percent of all the claims of nonmalignant injury filed 
during that period, even though most of those so recruited have no 
medically cognizable asbestos-related injury and cannot demonstrate 
any statistically significant increased likelihood of contracting an 
asbestos-related disease in the future when compared to other similarly 
 
 25 I. J. Selikoff, J. Churg & E. C. Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation 
Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 139 (1965), cited in 
RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
 26 Borel v. Fibreboard Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 
(1974). 
 27 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 422 (1983). 
 28 For further discussion of the entrepreneurial model of claim generation, see Brickman, 
supra note 23. 
 29 The following discussion of the entrepreneurial model is mostly based upon Brickman, id. 
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situated workers; 
(2) the manufacture of specious medical evidence, including: (a) 
evidence generated by the entrepreneurial screening enterprises and 
doctors that the plaintiffs’ lawyers select, who produce “diagnoses” 
which are not a product of good faith medical judgment but rather a 
function of the millions of dollars in income they receive for these 
services each year, and (b) pulmonary function tests, which screening 
companies often administer in violation of standards established by the 
American Thoracic Society, and which therefore often result in findings 
of impairment where none would be found but for the improper test 
administration;30 
(3) the use of entrepreneurial witness preparation techniques, 
frequently resulting in testimony that follows scripts prepared by 
lawyers, which scripts are often replete with misstatements regarding: 
 
 30 An analysis of the financial incentives that underpin the entrepreneurial model offers an 
explanation for the actions of plaintiff lawyer-selected B-readers and diagnosing doctors as well 
as screening enterprises that administer pulmonary function tests.  Each of these three critical 
participants in the entrepreneurial model is selling a service.  However, the service is not simply 
reading an X-ray film or administering a battery of pulmonary function tests (PFTs); it is 
“collecting evidence for future asbestos litigation.”  Motion for Case Mgmt. Order Concerning 
Mass Litig. Screenings at 6, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 2 MDL 875 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (quoting Brief of Appellants at 19, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 225 F.3d 648 (3d Cir. 
2000) (Nos. 98-1166, 98-1165)) (describing in detail, including references to depositions and 
exhibits, the operation of Most Health Services, Inc., a screening company).  Millions of dollars 
are paid annually to B-readers and screening enterprises that perform these services and get the 
“right” results in interpreting X-rays and CT (CAT) scans and administering PFT’s.  As U.S. 
District Court Judge Janis Jack, presiding over the silica MDL, observed, “in the business of mass 
screenings [for silicosis and asbestosis], a diagnosis, whether accurate or not, is money in the 
bank.”  In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1553, 2005 WL 1593936, at *53 (S.D. Tex. 
June 30, 2005).  I have previously concluded that service providers that fail to provide 
consistently high percentages of 1/0 readings or “diagnoses” of asbestosis, or consistently high 
percentages of findings of lung impairment, risk losing their place in the entrepreneurial process 
to other, more “efficient” providers that provide more favorable results.  Judge Jack reached the 
same conclusion, stating that “[w]hile a B-reader/diagnosing doctor is essential to the screening 
process, the doctor is fungible, and if the screening company or law firm was unhappy with one 
doctor’s rate of positive reads and/or diagnoses, then future business will go to another, more 
compliant doctor.”  Id. at *53.  In some cases, both B-readers—specifically certified pulmonary 
X-ray readers—and screening enterprises are paid more for positive outcomes than for negative 
ones.  See Brickman, supra note 23, at 90-94.  Moreover, some B-readers who read X-rays as 
“consistent with asbestosis” are hired to write the medical report, which relies on and incorporates 
the B-reading and, in most cases, constitutes the medical evidence introduced in support of the 
claim.  B-readers may charge two to four times for the medical report what they charge for a B-
reading alone.  Thus, a B-reader who reads a film as positive may earn a much larger fee than he 
or she would if he or she had read the film as negative.  The empirical evidence I have gathered to 
support my assertion about higher payments for positive outcomes is supplemented by Judge 
Jack’s findings.  She notes, for example, that the Campbell Cherry law firm paid N&M, a 
screening enterprise, $750 for screening a litigant as positive for silicosis but zero if the finding 
was negative.  Under that arrangement, N&M had a strong financial interest in the outcome of the 
screenings it conducted.  This incentive may account for N&M’s success in apparently screening 
only those who would be “diagnosed” as having silicosis and, in the process, generating 
approximately $3,192,000 in income from just that one law firm for producing 4,256 plaintiffs.  
In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *27-31; see also Brickman, supra note 23, at 74-75. 
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(a) the identification and relative quantities of asbestos-containing 
products with which claimants came in contact at work sites (in order to 
shift product “ID” from certain manufacturers that have declared 
bankruptcy to others that are solvent),31 (b) the information printed on 
the containers in which the products were sold, and (c) their own 
physical impairments; 
(4) the filing of massive numbers of claims in about twenty 
jurisdictions selected in part for their propensity (a) to fashion what I 
have called “special asbestos law”—a distortion of civil tort rules in 
order to accommodate many claimants’ inability to fulfill the usual 
evidentiary requirements for establishing proximate cause; and (b) to 
further accommodate mass claim filings by using aggregations and 
other procedural devices that, although purportedly intended to ease the 
burden on state court systems, have actually and perversely generated 
vastly increased claim filings; 
(5) the resort to settlement strategies (including “inventory” 
settlements and settlements of future claims according to a “matrix” of 
claim values), which defendants were compelled to pursue because the 
mass filings deprived them of any realistic opportunity to investigate the 
claims,32 a substantial number of which lacked merit and credible 
 
 31 The fungability of product identification testimony by claimants and their witnesses is a 
function of entrepreneurial witness preparation techniques.  When former main targets of the 
litigation enter bankruptcy and the value of claims against that entity decline precipitously, 
claimants’ testimony as to which products they were exposed to and the relative quantities of 
those products appears to change so as to downplay the quantities of the bankrupted companies’ 
products and instead “ID” theretofore unidentified products of other, still solvent companies.  
These periodic changes in testimony appear to result from witness coaching and further appear to 
have the purpose of maintaining the cash flow that is the objective of the entrepreneurial model.  
Indeed, claimants continue to “discover” products they have not previously identified as causally 
related to the claimed disease, and to “ID” those products in new lawsuits they bring five, ten, or 
even twenty years after having filed initial sets of claims against several score of other 
defendants.  The ability to add virtually any manufacturer, seller, distributor, or installer of 
asbestos-containing products as a defendant whenever doing so is financially beneficial, 
seemingly irrespective of any actual and substantial exposure to the company’s products, is a 
central feature of the entrepreneurial asbestos litigation model.  Judge Jack commented on this 
phenomenon in the silica MDL, observing that: 
In many cases, the number of Defendants [named by Plaintiffs represented by one law 
firm] bear no apparent relationship to the number of Plaintiffs [represented by that 
firm].  Instead, the number of Defendants (and the identity of the Defendants) seem to 
be contingent on the identity of the Plaintiffs’ law firms rather than the identity of the 
Plaintiffs.  For instance, O’Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle is Plaintiffs’ counsel in 18 MDL 
cases, 16 of which are brought against the same 73 Defendants, despite the fact that the 
Plaintiffs in those 16 cases range in number from 9 to 410.  Likewise, Campbell, 
Cherry, Harrison, Davis & Dove is Plaintiffs’ counsel in two MDL cases, one with 247 
Plaintiffs and one with 4,280 Plaintiffs but both against the same 134 Defendants. 
In re Silica Prods 2005 WL 1593936, at *17 n.15. 
 32 As noted by Judge Jack in the silica MDL proceeding, the entrepreneurial claim generation 
strategy seeks  
to inflate the number of Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the Defendants and 
the judicial system.  This is apparently done in hopes of extracting mass nuisance-value 
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evidence of injury or exposure to defendants’ products;33 these attempts 
to tame litigation costs not only failed, but actually provided cash flow 
to underwrite the cost of additional screenings; and 
(6) the inexorable result of bankruptcy filings by more than 
seventy companies to date because of asbestos-related liabilities, though 
the advent of bankruptcy has not resolved the problem of overwhelming 
numbers of meritless claims; instead, an analogous set of problems 
surfaces when claimants present these claims for payment under criteria 
determined by leading plaintiff lawyers and set out in the Trust 
Distribution Procedures of trusts created in the aftermath of these 
bankruptcies.34 
 
settlements because the Defendants and the judicial system are financially incapable of 
examining the merits of each individual claim in the usual manner. 
Id. at *95.  
 33 It has been widely acknowledged that these sorts of settlement strategies have resulted in 
defendants paying substantial sums to claimants without valid claims.  For example, Judge John 
Fullam, presiding over the Owens Corning bankruptcy, issued a memorandum and order stating 
that it is “reasonably well known” that Owens Corning’s history of dealing with asbestosis claims 
“has included payments to large numbers of claimants who actually sustained little or no harm 
from their exposure to Owens Corning’s products.”  In re Owens Corning, Nos. 00-3837 to -
3854, slip op. at 1-2 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 22, 2004).  Because of economic considerations, 
defendants usually performed little or no investigation into the merits of the thousands of 
inventory and future claims they settled.  Former Attorney General of the United States Griffin 
Bell has stated: 
Many [asbestos] defendants are reluctant to demand X-rays and conduct such audits for 
fear that plaintiff lawyers will target the company, refuse to settle any claims, and try 
their most serious cancer cases in plaintiff friendly jurisdictions.  While serious cases 
are relatively few in number compared to cases filed by the unimpaired, the risk of 
even a handful of multimillion dollar verdicts often dissuades defendants from a high 
profile, contentious fight that could bankrupt the company in the short term.  One 
business analyst has observed, “[I]n a sense, the plaintiffs’ attorneys have the asbestos 
defendants held hostage.”  Defendants often conclude that rather than question this X-
ray evidence, it is cheaper to treat the claims as administrative costs, regardless of 
merit, than to litigate.  This strategy has failed for a number of defendants in the long 
run, as an endless supply of nonsick claimants have replenished the plaintiff lawyers’ 
client base, leaving bankruptcy as the only realistic option for those companies. 
Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts’ Duty to Help Solve the 
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6 BRIEFLY . . . PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG., AND LITIG. (NAT’L LEGAL 
CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, D.C.), June 2002, at 16.  
 34 Beginning with the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, trusts have been created to which 
current and future asbestos claims are channeled.  In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy 
Code to formalize this process.  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)-(h).  However, in practice, plaintiff lawyers, 
who exercise effective control over the creation of asbestos bankruptcy trusts, largely dictate the 
trusts’ structures and procedures.  See Administration of Large Business Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations: Has Competition for Big Cases Corrupted the Bankruptcy System?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial And Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 19-20 (2004) (written statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law); Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTUNE, Mar. 
4, 2002, at 154.  As a consequence, trusts have not been structured to effectively distinguish 
between valid claims by plaintiffs who are actually sick as a result of exposure to debtors’ 
products and the hundreds of thousands of invalid claims brought by unimpaired, asymptomatic 
claimants or claimants lacking significant exposure to debtors’ products.  Instead, the trusts have 
been structured to favor the interests of the lawyers controlling the trusts’ creation by, for 
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It is thus beyond cavil that the quantum of specious claiming in 
asbestos litigation constitutes a massive civil justice system failure. 
 
II.     THE JUDICIAL PLEA FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
 
As the stream of litigation became a river and then a flood, the 
claim filings overwhelmed courts.  In September 1990, United States 
Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed an Ad 
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to “address . . . the massive and 
complex issues involved with asbestos litigation,” and to “consider all 
necessary administrative steps that may be taken under existing law . . . 
[as well as] legislative remedies or amendments to the federal rules of 
practice and procedures.”35  In March 1991, the Committee issued a 
report, which the Judicial Conference of the United States subsequently 
adopted, recommending that Congress enact 
a national legislative scheme to come to grips with the impending 
disaster relating to resolution of asbestos personal injury disputes, 
with the objectives of achieving timely appropriate compensation of 
present and future asbestos victims and of maximizing the prospects 
for the economic survival and viability of the defendants.36 
The Committee concluded that the volume of asbestos litigation 
had reached “critical dimensions . . . [and] is becoming a disaster of 
major proportions . . . which the courts are ill-equipped to meet 
effectively.”37  It went on to state that “[t]he ultimate solution should be 
legislation recognizing the national proportions of the problem . . . and 
creating a national asbestos dispute resolution scheme . . . .”38 
Ironically, at the time of the Judicial Conference report, the 
consequences of entrepreneurial claim generation and the other features 
of the entrepreneurial model had only begun to be realized.  Even so, 
Congress so far has declined to enact legislation to deal with what the 
Supreme Court has referred to as “the elephantine mass of asbestos 
cases . . . [that] defies customary judicial administration and calls for 
national legislation.”39  The Ad Hoc Committee’s dire predictions as to 
 
example, paying their claims earlier and at higher levels than claims that arise later in the process 
without regard to merit or causation.  This has resulted in the rapid depletion of trust assets. 
 35 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF THE AD HOC 
COMMITTEE 1 (1991) [hereinafter AD HOC REPORT]. 
 36 Id. at 27. 
 37 Id. at 2.  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has reached similar conclusions.  
See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
 38 AD HOC REPORT, supra note 35, at 2. 
 39 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).  The Court stated these words in the 
process of setting aside a $1.5 billion settlement of asbestos litigation and essentially declaring 
that the class action mechanism set out in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could 
not be used to fashion a global settlement of asbestos litigation.  See also Norfolk & Western Ry. 
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what would occur in the absence of a legislative resolution not only 
came to fruition, but in fact came to be greatly exceeded.   
 
III.     LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO FIX THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS 
 
Legislative efforts to establish an administrative alternative to 
asbestos litigation date back to 1977, when Representative Millicent 
Fenwick (R-N.J.) introduced the first asbestos-specific compensation 
bill, which proposed the creation of a fund to pay compensation for 
asbestos-related disease.40  A variety of proposals since then have 
ranged from: (1) a tort reform approach including such measures as 
strengthening venue requirements and eliminating spurious joinders to 
preclude widespread forum shopping, capping or otherwise limiting 
punitive damages, limiting joint and several liability, removing the 
windfall element from the application of the successor liability doctrine, 
restricting judicial resort to mass aggregations and other procedural 
devices that have had the effect of coercing settlement of nonmeritorous 
claims; to (2) the promulgation of “medical/exposure criteria” that 
claimants would have to meet in order to pursue an asbestos-related 
claim in the tort system; to (3) the creation of a fund to provide 
compensation to those injured by exposure to asbestos (as defined in the 
legislation creating the fund) in lieu of resort to the tort system.  The 
oft-repeated intent of many of the legislative proposals has been to 
provide fairness and efficiency for claimants, relief for overburdened 
courts, financial certainty for the businesses funding any trust fund, and 
economic stability for companies pressed to the brink of bankruptcy by 
present and future asbestos exposure claims. 
 
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003). 
 40 For discussion of congressional proposals to reform asbestos litigation, see Mary S. Lyman 
& Letitia Chambers, Asbestos Litigation: A History of Congressional Consideration 1977 to 
2000, 3-3 MEALEY’S ASB. BANKR. REP. 24 (2003); see also Lester Brickman, The Asbestos 
Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1891, 1891 n.1 (1992).  In 1991, I drafted a proposed administrative alternative to asbestos 
litigation at the request of the Administrative Conference of the United States and organized a 
colloquy to consider the proposal.  See Marshall Breger, Chairman, Admin. Conference of the 
U.S., Colloquy: An Administrative Alternative to Tort Litigation to Resolve Asbestos Claims 4 
(Oct. 31, 1991) (transcript on file with the Cardozo Law Review).  To participate in the colloquy, 
I invited U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein; Deborah Hensler of RAND’s Civil Justice 
Institute; Ronald Motley, a plaintiffs’ lawyer; Andrew Berry, a defense lawyer; Howard Samuel 
of the AFL-CIO; and Judge G. Mervin Bober, Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge of the 
U.S. Department of Labor.  The proposal, which was also discussed at hearings before a 
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, would create an industry-financed trust fund to 
pay asbestos claims that meet certain medical criteria according to a matrix of claim values.  See 
Effects of Asbestos Injury on Federal and State Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 
(1991) (statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
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IV.     S. 852: THE FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION (FAIR) 
ACT OF 2005 
A.     Legislative History 
 
After numerous hearings and unsuccessful proposals in Congress 
over more than two decades, the Senate Judiciary Committee undertook 
the present effort to reform asbestos litigation with hearings beginning 
in 2002.  On May 22, 2003, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, then Chairman of 
the Committee, introduced Senate Bill 1125 (S. 1125), the FAIR Act of 
2003, co-sponsored by five Republicans and two Democrats. 
In lieu of tort reform or a “medical/exposure criteria” approach, S. 
1125 adopted the trust fund approach to resolving the asbestos litigation 
crisis and incorporated “medical/exposure criteria” elements.  Under S. 
1125, a no-fault administrative process would replace civil lawsuits and 
would compensate individuals injured by asbestos according to a 
schedule of values.  S. 1125 provided an exclusive, administrative 
forum for all future asbestos personal injury claims, including those 
claims pending in bankruptcy court or before bankruptcy trusts.41  If 
enacted, according to commentators, S. 1125 would “bring to an end 
asbestos litigation, as we know it.”42  After hearings, input from experts 
and stakeholders, and four mark-up sessions that resulted in the 
adoption of numerous amendments, the Committee reported out S. 1125 
on July 10, 2003 by a party-line vote of ten in favor, eight opposed, and 
one abstention.  The version of S. 1125 that passed the Committee 
established a $108 billion Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund (the 
“Fund”), which consisted of payments of $52 billion from defendants 
and $52 billion from insurers, with the remaining $4 billion to be paid 
from bankruptcy asbestos trusts.  The proposed $108 billion Fund was 
more than double the $45 billion fund the bill provided when it was first 
introduced.43  In addition, in the event the Fund was later found to be 
unable to pay all claims, S. 1125 provided for contingent funding that 
could range from $31 billion to $45 billion, to be paid by insurers and 
defendant participants.44 
Following the Committee’s action, key stakeholders objected to 
various provisions of the bill.45  To address their concerns, Senator 
 
 41 See Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Legislation: Federal and State (Oct. 26, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cardozo Law Review); Linda Martin Barber & Mary 
Lyman, The Fairness in Asbestos Reform Act—What Will It Do, Where Is It Now?, 19-5 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 28 (2004). 
 42 Barber & Lyman, supra note 41, at 28. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Hanlon, supra note 41, at 12. 
 45 The groups that have actively represented stakeholders in the legislative process include 
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the Asbestos Study Group (ASM), which 
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Arlen Specter invited representatives of defendant companies, insurers 
and reinsurers, and labor and trial lawyers to meet.  At Senator 
Specter’s request, Senior Judge Edward R. Becker of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit served as overseer/mediator of 
the group.  Later that fall, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist held a series 
of meetings with affected parties and, on October 15, 2003, announced 
that insurers and defendant companies had reached an agreement 
concerning the amount of their financial contributions to the trust fund 
established by the bill.  Senator Frist acknowledged, however, that 
many details remained to be worked out.46  Stakeholders and a 
bipartisan group of senators continued to work on financial and 
structural issues through the Fall of 2003 but did not reach a consensus, 
and Congress adjourned for the year without a floor vote. 
On April 7, 2004, Senator Hatch introduced Senate Bill 2290 (S. 
2290), the FAIR Act of 2004.  In its summary of the changes from S. 
1125 as reported, the Committee reiterated the objective that the FAIR 
Act “must preempt and supersede all asbestos claims filed in the current 
tort system.”47  Among the changes made were an increase in claim 
values, a “more streamlined” administrative structure, and a new 
funding proposal to make funds available within months of the bill’s 
enactment.48  Under this revised version of the Act, defendants would 
be required to pay annual aggregate payments of $2.5 billion for 
twenty-three years or until a total of $57.5 billion was reached.  If the 
Fund could not meet its financial obligations, the Fund’s Administrator 
could seek an additional amount, up to $10 billion, from defendants.  
The bill also required insurers to pay $46.025 billion over a twenty-
seven-year period. 
Majority Leader Frist’s efforts to bring up S. 2290 for a floor vote 
floundered when the Senate failed to invoke cloture in the face of 
objections.  At Senator Specter’s request, Judge Becker reconvened the 
stakeholder meetings.  Various stakeholders then met with Judge 
Becker thirty-six times between August 2003 and January 2005 in an 
 
represents many of the major asbestos defendants, the American Insurance Association (AIA), the 
Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America (PCI), the Reinsurers Association of 
America (RAA), and Equitas, the entity that holds reserves and handles pre-1993 claims for 
certain Lloyds of London syndicates. 
 46 The agreement reportedly called for a base fund of $114 billion, into which insurers would 
pay $46.025 billion and defendants would pay $57.5 billion.  Barber & Lyman, supra note 41.  In 
addition, defendants would pay $10 billion to a contingency fund, with a possible additional $10 
billion payment later if needed to secure the fund.  Id. 
 47 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 108TH CONG., S. 2290, THE FAIRNESS IN 
ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION ACT OF 2004 HATCH/FRIST/MILLER BILL, SUMMARY OF 
CHANGES FROM S. 1125 AS REPORTED 1 (Comm. Print 2004), reprinted in 150 CONG. REC. 
S4107 (2004). 
 48 Id. at 6. 
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effort to grapple with the unresolved issues concerning the bill.49 
After the 109th Congress convened, in January 2005, Senator 
Specter, now Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, held two hearings 
on new drafts of the bill.  On April 19, 2005, he introduced S. 852, the 
FAIR Act of 2005, with bipartisan sponsorship.  Further hearings were 
held in April 2005, followed by six Committee markup sessions in April 
and May, with numerous amendments considered and many accepted.  
On May 26, 2005, the Committee approved S. 852 by a thirteen-to-five 
vote, with three Democrats and all Republicans voting in favor.  This 
latest iteration of the FAIR Act contemplates a $140 billion Trust Fund.  
In this essay, I will analyze the costs that may be incurred in the effort 
to resolve personal injury asbestos claims by enacting S. 852 that are in 
addition to the projected $140 billion Trust Fund S. 852 proposes.  
 
B.     S. 852: A Summary50 
 
Like its predecessor FAIR bills, S. 852, the FAIR Act of 2005, 
would take asbestos claims out of the courts and substitute a no-fault51 
administrative claims-handling system administered by a newly created 
Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation (OADC), to be housed within 
the U.S. Department of Labor and funded through a national trust 
fund.52  The OADC would resolve claims within a limited time frame 
and would issue a written proposed decision of the OADC 
 
 49 S. REP. NO. 109-97, at 5-6 (2005).   
 50 S. 852 is undoubtedly one of the most complex pieces of legislation ever attempted.  Many 
of its provisions are the product of intensive negotiations among the stakeholders and have been 
substantially revised over the past two years.  As with any complex piece of legislation that has 
undergone substantial redrafting, a number of the resulting provisions are opaque and subject to 
differing interpretations. 
  For a more complete summary of S. 852’s provisions, see Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos 
Litigation: The Fair Act Two Years On, 1 PRATT’S J. OF BANKR. L. 207 (2005).  A unique feature 
of S. 852, which I do not discuss, is the provision that specifically applies to claimants from 
Libby, Montana.  These special-purpose provisions provide that asbestos exposure is presumed 
for those who have resided in or around Libby for twelve months.  Moreover, there is no 
requirement of impairment from restrictive disease.  The net effect is to allow those claimants to 
receive a minimum of $400,000 in compensation for smoking-related diseases.  See id. at 215-18.  
Studies mandated by the bill could extend the “Libby” provision to twenty-eight other locations.  
Though this outcome is unlikely, the potential costs of a finding that other locations qualify for 
“Libby” coverage are so substantial that they could lead the Trust Fund to an early sunset. 
  I also do not discuss the provision allowing people exposed to naturally-occurring asbestos 
to file an “exceptional medical claim,” S. 852, 109th Cong. § 121(g)(10) (2005); infra note 56, 
and the adjustment for claimants who have claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA), which governs claims by workers in the railroad industry, S. 852 § 131(b)(4).  See 
Hanlon, supra, at 219. 
 51 As in any no-fault compensation program, a number of claimants who would not have a 
claim against defendants in the tort system are nonetheless eligible to receive an award from the 
Trust Fund.   
 52 S. 852 § 101. 
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Administrator within ninety days of the filing of a complete claim.53  S. 
852 also calls for an accelerated review process and a payment 
procedure under which payment of claims would begin upon the 
OADC’s final decision and would be completed within four years at the 
latest.54  Special expedited procedures are established for claimants with 
mesothelioma and others with less than a year to live and their 
survivors.55  Asbestos disease claimants’ eligibility for compensation 
would be based upon standardized medical criteria.  As set out in 
section 121 of S. 852, to be awarded compensation under the bill, a 
claimant would have to satisfy the enumerated medical and exposure 
requirements for one of nine disease levels,56 each of which has a 
specified award:57 
Level I (Asbestosis/Pleural Disease A), award of medical monitoring 
only;58 
Level II (Mixed Disease with Impairment), $25,000 award;59 
Level III (Asbestosis/Pleural Disease B), $100,000 award;60 
Level IV (Severe Asbestosis), $400,000 award;61 
Level V (Disabling Asbestosis), $850,000 award;62 
Level VI (Other Cancers, such as colon, larynx, pharynx, or stomach, 
if exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor), 
$200,000 award;63 
Level VII (Lung Cancer with Pleural Disease), awards of $300,000 
to smokers, $725,000 to ex-smokers, and $800,000 to nonsmokers;64 
Level VIII (Lung Cancer with Asbestosis), awards of $600,000 to 
 
 53 Id. § 114(b). 
 54 Id. §§ 114(d), 133(a)(1). 
 55 Id. § 106(c). 
 56 The bill allows limited exceptions for certain “exceptional medical claims” with eligibility 
based upon comparable medical evidence to be reviewed by a Physicians’ Panel. 
 57 S. 852 § 131(b)(1).  All award values are offset for prior settlements and verdicts, id. § 
134(a), but not for workers’ compensation benefits, id. § 134(b)(1).  See also discussion infra 
Section V.C.3.  S. 852 precludes railroad workers, who otherwise would be eligible to make 
asbestos-based FELA claims against railroads, from bringing such claims, but also provides those 
workers with an upward adjustment in award values to 110% of the average settlement value for 
the relevant disease category.  Id. §§ 403, 131(b)(4). 
 58 S. 852 §§ 121(d)(1), 131(b)(1). 
 59 Id. §§ 121(d)(2), 131(b)(1). 
 60 Id. §§ 121(d)(3), 131(b)(1). 
 61 Id. §§ 121(d)(4), 131(b)(1). 
 62 Id. §§ 121(d)(5), 131(b)(1). 
 63 Id. §§ 121(d)(6), 131(b)(1).  Although medical literature casts serious doubt on whether 
asbestos exposure causes any of the “other” cancers, these claims do succeed in the tort system 
though defendants often prevail in jury trials.  For these reasons, the bill provides that a panel of 
physicians must decide all claims in this category.  In addition, the bill mandates an accelerated 
study of asbestos causation of these cancers by the Institute of Medicine, which conclusions the 
panels are required to follow.  Id. §§ 121(d)(6), (e), 131(b)(1). 
 64 Id. §§ 121(d)(7), 131(b)(1). 
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smokers, $975,000 to former smokers, and $1,100,000 to 
nonsmokers;65 and 
Level IX (Mesothelioma), $1,100,000 award.66 
Levels I to V are nonmalignant conditions; Levels VI to IX are 
malignant conditions.  Level I claimants are those who have had some 
asbestos exposure and have been diagnosed with an asbestos-related 
condition (pleural plaques, pleural thickening, or a 1/0 X-ray reading on 
the ILO scale, which litigation doctors in asbestos litigation testify is 
“consistent with asbestosis,” though this is not, in and of itself, a 
diagnosis) but cannot demonstrate any impairment of pulmonary 
function.67  Since these claimants have no asbestos-related disease, the 
bill provides no compensation for them.  They are entitled, however, to 
“medical monitoring” costs, i.e., reasonable costs of triennial medical 
testing.68  Levels III, IV, and V require a chest X-ray showing asbestosis 
or asbestos-related pleural changes, and pulmonary function tests 
indicating restrictive lung impairment.69 
Payment of all awards would be accomplished through the 
Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund,70 a $140 billion repository 
created entirely with private funding.  Mandatory contributions would 
consist of: total payments not to exceed $90 billion over the life of the 
fund71 (with a minimum annual aggregate payment of $3 billion)72 from 
defendant companies and $46.025 billion from insurers,73 less any 
 
 65 Id. §§ 121(d)(8), 131(b)(1). 
 66 Id. §§ 121(d)(9), 131(b)(1). 
 67 Id. § 121(d)(1). 
 68 Id. § 131(b)(1).  While the cost of this provision is insubstantial in relation to the cost of 
the Trust Fund, it should be noted that providing “medical monitoring” costs serves a political 
purpose but has no medical justification.  Most asbestos-related conditions, including 
mesthelioma and asbestosis, are untreatable.  Screening for lung cancer may have some health-
related value but this is unrealized under S. 852.  Providing for medical monitoring costs 
therefore does not advance any health-related interest.  Moreover, there is no scientifically 
credible evidence that those diagnosed with pleural plaques have any greater likelihood of 
contracting an asbestos-related disease than co-workers similarly exposed who have not 
developed pleural plaques.  See Brickman, supra note 23, at 52-53.   
 69 Id. § 121(d)(3)-(5).  This issue of whether a lung impairment is found to be “restrictive,” 
i.e., characterized by a reduction in lung capacity due to asbestos exposure, or “obstructive,” i.e., 
characterized by an obstruction of the air passageways in the lungs mostly due to smoking, or a 
combination of both, will have significant impact on the aggregate amounts to be paid for these 
claims.  Levels III, IV, and V are distinguished by the degree of lung impairment, ranging from 
minimal to moderate to severe.  
 70 Id. § 221. 
 71 Id. § 202(a)(2). 
 72 Id. § 204(h). 
 73 Id. § 212(a)(2).  Unlike the defendants who have an allocation system, albeit a complex 
one, no allocation system exists for insurers.  Instead, the bill provides for an “Asbestos Insurers 
Commission” to adopt allocation principles and apply them to all insurers with $1 million or 
more in liabilities.  Id. § 212(c).  The complexities of this process are discussed in Hanlon, supra 
note 50, at 227-30.  
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bankruptcy trust credits under section 222(d),74 with the remainder to be 
paid from asbestos bankruptcy trust funds.75   
The bill would require each “defendant participant” to make 
scheduled payments based upon its placement in a complicated system 
of tiers and sub-tiers.76  To provide assets for the Trust Fund’s 
formation, insurers’ payments would be front-loaded; $20.625 billion of 
their total payment obligation would be due within the first five years, 
with up to fifty percent of the first year’s payment required within 
ninety days of the bill’s enactment.77   
The assets of bankruptcy trusts confirmed after July 31, 2004 are 
also to be transferred into the Trust Fund, but all such assets would be 
credited against the payments due from the defendants and insurers.78   
The Trust Fund Administrator would be authorized to impose a pro 
rata surcharge on all participants “to ensure the liquidity of the Fund” if 
the transfer of assets from other bankruptcy trusts is held up in litigation 
or for other reasons and if borrowing is insufficient to insure the Trust 
Fund’s ability to meet its obligations without risking termination.79  As 
a further “fail-safe” against shortfalls in the Trust Fund, the 
Administrator would be authorized to borrow from both commercial 
lenders and the Federal Financing Bank.  Defendant and insurer 
participants would be obligated to repay amounts that the Administrator 
borrows.80 
In the event the Trust Fund becomes over-funded in relationship to 
the claims being asserted, funding “holiday” and “step-down” 
provisions allow for reduced payments into the Trust Fund.  Ten years 
after enactment, the defendant and insurer contributors may be entitled 
to a “holiday” for all or a portion of that year’s annual contribution.81  
Rigid requirements must be fulfilled and the Administrator may revoke 
 
 74 The bankruptcy trust credits referred to in section 222 are applied against both defendants’ 
and insurers’ shares.  S. 852 § 222(d)(1).  To the extent such credits are applied, they will reduce 
the overall size of the Trust Fund.  However, credits are granted solely for assets the Trust Fund 
receives from bankruptcy trusts that were confirmed and “substantially consummated” after July 
31, 2004.  Id.  To date, there has been only one such confirmation: Mid-Valley (DII Industries 
and Kellogg Brown & Root—subsidiaries of Halliburton).  This trust has been funded with 
approximately $2.4 billion in cash and 59.5 million shares of Halliburton stock, as well as by 
financing and a letter of credit.  The total value of the trust’s assets approximates $5 billion.  See 
Russell Gold, Halliburton Finalizes Settlement for $5.1 Billion Over Asbestos, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
4, 2005, at A3. 
 75 S. 852 § 402(a)(2). 
 76 Id. § 204(i); see also Hanlon, supra note 50, at 220-23.  A series of complex provisions in 
S. 852 deals with “inequity adjustments” in such instances.  S. 852 § 204(d)(3), (m), 203(g)(3).   
 77 Id. § 212(a)(3)(C), (e)(1).  Front-loading imposes an additional cost because of the time 
value of money. 
 78 Id. § 222(d)(2)(A)-(B). 
 79 Id. § 222(c)(1)(A)-(B). 
 80 Id. § 221(b)(4). 
 81 Id. §§ 205(b), 212(a)(3)(F). 
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any holiday.  Defendants are also entitled to a “step-down” whereby at 
the end of the tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth years of the 
Trust Fund, their annual contribution is reduced by ten percent.82  The 
Administrator can nullify any such step down if he or she determines 
that it would jeopardize the Trust Fund’s ability to meet its obligations.   
The assets of asbestos bankruptcy trusts confirmed before July 31, 
2004, which were estimated to be approximately $4 billion,83 are to be 
transferred into the Trust Fund and are considered to be part of the $140 
billion cost.84  The Administrator of the OACD would manage the Trust 
Fund and would be authorized to borrow for the Trust Fund and to 
invest Trust Fund assets.85  The Administrator must submit an Annual 
Report to Congress on the condition of the Trust Fund and may bring 
about the termination of the Trust Fund and the sunsetting of the Act if 
he/she determines that the Trust Fund will have insufficient resources to 
pay claims and meet its other obligations.86 
 
V.     ADOPTION OF S. 852: HOW MUCH WILL THE PROPOSED 
“FIX” COST DEFENDANTS AND INSURERS? 
 
If S. 852 is enacted, it will impose costs on businesses and insurers 
in the form of required payments into the Trust Fund.  In addition to 
these payments, however, businesses and insurers may incur a variety of 
other substantial costs to resolve pending and future asbestos-related 
personal injury claims.  In this section, I consider both the costs 
imposed by S. 852 and the additional costs that may be incurred for 
such resolution.  In some cases, these additional costs are a function of 
provisions in S. 852; some of these costs, however, already exist in the 
tort system, and would have to be resolved irrespective of whether 
Congress enacts S. 852. 
The magnitude of future asbestos-related tort system costs, 
however, is a subject of renewed intense scrutiny because of issues of 
legitimacy and the effect of structural changes in the tort system.  I have 
previously concluded that a substantial number of nonmalignant claims 
generated by mass screenings are specious.87  U.S District Court Judge 
John P. Fullam, who presided over the Owens Corning bankruptcy, 
 
 82 Id. § 205(a). 
 83 S. REP. NO. 109-97, at 26 (2005). 
 84 Id.  The value and number of the trust confirmed before July 31, 2004 likely increased 
since S. 1125 and S. 2290, the predecessors to S. 852, were first considered; however, the trustees 
of certain of these pre-July 31, 2004 trusts have threatened to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Act, thereby leaving the actual amount to be realized from these trusts uncertain. 
 85 S. 852 § 101(c). 
 86 Id. § 405. 
 87 See Brickman, supra note 23.   
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acknowledged a number of the concerns I expressed about large 
numbers of these claims lacking validity.88  U.S. District Judge Janis 
Jack has found that lawyers, B-readers, diagnosing doctors and 
screening companies—who have accounted for tens of thousands of 
asbestos-related claims—had engaged in a scheme to manufacture 
diagnoses of silicosis for money.89  And a year and a half long 
investigation of both asbestos and silica claim generation is underway in 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.90  
Finally, extensive tort reform efforts in the form of judicial rulings on 
procedural and substantive issues and the enactment of state legislation 
are causing dramatic declines in nonmalignant claim filings.91 
 
A.     Costs Within the Trust Fund 
 
The amount of money required to fund the Trust Fund to ensure 
payment of present and future claims has been the subject of debate 
since S. 1125 was first proposed.  In the more than two years since the 
FAIR Act of 2003 was presented, the proposed Trust Fund has been 
increased from $45 billion, to $108 billion in S. 1125, to $124 billion in 
S. 2290, to $140 billion in S. 852.  The Judiciary Committee Report on 
the FAIR Act of 2005, submitted by its Chairman, Senator Arlen 
Specter, concludes that the sum of $140 billion “is based on sound 
statistical data and economic models, and is more than adequate to 
compensate all victims of asbestos-related disease.”92  But for a small 
fraction, all of the $140 billion for the Trust Fund is raised from 
defendant and insurer participants   
This brief history describes the absolute and contingent amounts 
that S. 852 would require defendant and insurer participants to pay into 
the Trust Fund.  As the debate over the number and cost of future claims 
continues while S. 852 is under consideration, there appears to be a 
 
 88 Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, No. 04-00905, slip op. (D. Del. Mar. 31, 
2005); see also In re Owens Corning, Nos. 00-3837 to -3854, slip op. at 1-2 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 
22, 2004) (indicating “it will . . . be necessary to structure a program of payments which . . . 
recognizes only legitimate claims,” especially in view of the fact that Owens Corning had made 
“payments to large numbers of claimants who actually sustained little or no harm from their 
exposure to Owens Corning’s products”). 
 89 See supra note 11; infra text accompanying notes 149-150. 
 90 See Jonathan D. Glater, Asbestos Fund Bars 9 Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at C1; 
Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyers Challenged On Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at C1.   
 91  See supra note 14; infra note 93. 
 92  S. REP. NO. 109-97, at 86 (2005).  In their June 22, 2005 letter to Senate colleagues, 
Senators Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy, ranking minority member, commented “Majority 
Leader [William] Frist and then-Democratic Leader [Tom] Daschle agreed that the Fund should 
be set at $140 billion, which has been generally accepted as sufficient to ensure adequate payment 
to victims and is now embodied in S. 852.”  Letter from Senator Arlen Specter & Senator Patrick 
Leahy to U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 22, 2005), cited in S. REP. NO. 109-97.  
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general acceptance of the $140 billion size of the Trust Fund.93  
 
 93 While plaintiffs’ counsel, labor unions, defendants, and insurers have disputed this figure, 
saying it is either too high or too low, the Senate Judiciary Committee has treated $140 billion as 
the correct amount, so I will use that figure as the basis for this discussion.  One business 
publication has noted that while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Trust 
Fund may pay out less than $140 billion, the CBO adds as a caveat that the Trust Fund might end 
up paying out $150 billion over its estimated fifty-year lifetime.  Asbestos Trust Fund Analysis 
Shows Need For Change, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Sept. 5, 2005.  The publication goes on to state: 
The CBO notes that while the trust is likely to be funded at the proposed $140 
billion level, nobody can predict with any accuracy the value of legitimate claims 
presented to it.  CBO estimates they could range anywhere from $120 billion to 
$150 billion over 50 years.  Given the difficulty of projecting financial 
performance of anything for five years, let alone a half-century, we feel that those 
numbers must be taken with a ton of salt. 
Id.  Even though it appears the issue of the Trust Fund’s size has been resolved, analyses 
sponsored by interested parties contend that S. 852 is significantly under-funded.  Bates White, 
LLC, an economic consulting firm, prepared an analysis of S. 852 and concluded that the bill 
would create entitlements in pending and future claimants to approximately $300 billion, leaving 
S. 852’s $140 billion Trust Fund with a $160 billion shortfall.  See BATES WHITE, LLC, 
ANALYSIS OF S. 852, FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION (FAIR) ACT 5 (2005).  The 
firm identifies two categories of claimants that it says pose the greatest threat to the Trust Fund’s 
financial viability: “lung and other cancer” claimants, and dormant claimants who can recover the 
difference between amounts previously collected in the tort system and the award levels specified 
in S. 852.  Id.  The firm argues that S. 852 creates much higher entitlements for “lung and other 
cancer” claimants than is projected by the CBO because, in their view, far more “lung and other 
cancer” claimants can demonstrate pleural changes (and thus become eligible for levels VI and 
VII compensation) than the CBO projects.  They also argue that the number of claimants thus 
eligible for compensation will far exceed the number that are able to obtain compensation in the 
tort system.  Id. at 11.  This is so, they state, because pleural changes—indications of 
abnormalities in the thin lining of the lung that may be associated with asbestos exposure and that 
are asymptomatic—are far more prevalent among the relevant population than the drafters of S. 
852 contemplated.  Id. at 11-17.  For a discussion of pleural changes, see Brickman, supra note 
23, at 51-54.   
 On the other hand, there may be reason to conclude that the Trust Fund is over-funded.  
While so noting, I do not address in this essay the issue of whether the Trust Fund’s size is 
appropriate.  
 In its most recent Cost Estimate of S. 852, dated August 25, 2005, the CBO discusses the 
number of pending and future claims as part of its calculation of how much funding the Trust 
Fund will require.  It concludes that future malignant claims will number 78,000 and will receive 
$74 billion from the Trust Fund.  Future nonmalignant claims are projected to number 1,184,000 
and to receive $32 billion.  (The remaining $25 billion is for pending claims.)  The report states: 
CBO expects that the ratio of nonmalignant claims to malignancies under the bill 
would be similar to the historical ratio of claims compensated by existing bankruptcy 
trusts.  For example, since 1995, the Manville Trust has received an average of eight 
claims for nonmalignant conditions for every claim for a malignant condition.  Based 
on those historical data and because nonmalignant claimants could receive larger 
awards under S. 852 than those provided by existing trust funds, CBO estimates that 
during the first 10 years after enactment, the fund would compensate, on average, 10 
new claims for nonmalignant conditions for every new malignancy (including 
claimants exposed to asbestos with lung cancer who would not be eligible for 
compensation under the bill).  CBO expects that this ratio would decrease over time 
because of reductions in the use of and exposure to asbestos.  (Other analysts have 
estimated the ratio of claims for nonmalignant conditions to malignancies to be as low 
as 7:1 or as high as 17:1.)  In total, CBO anticipates about 1.2 million future claims for 
nonmalignant conditions. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 852 FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION 
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Accordingly, for purposes of this analysis, I will use $140 billion as the 
cost of the Trust Fund.  As discussed below, however, that sum exceeds 
projected costs by $7 billion—a sum that was thought to be required to 
 
ACT OF 2005, at 9 [hereinafter 2005 CBO REPORT].  The CBO’s analysis, however, fails to take 
into account a substantial decline in nonmalignant asbestos claiming that began in the second half 
of 2003.  In 2003, new claim filings against the Manville Trust totaled approximately 101,200, a 
record for any year.  In 2004, however, the number of new claimants dropped to 14,600—a 
decrease of approximately 85%.  The ratio of nonmalignant to malignant claims declined from 
9:1 in 2003 to 3:1 in 2004.  From January 1 through June 30, 2005, 11,200 new claims were filed 
with the Manville Trust versus 7,400 in the first half of 2004.  Letter from Robert A. Falise, supra 
note 7.  If the same filing rate prevails for the remainder of 2005, the Manville Trust will receive 
22,400 new claims in 2005 versus 14,600 in 2004, an increase but still a 77.8% decline when 
compared to 2003.  Of the 9,355 new claims filed through May 31, 2005 (for which data is 
available), 2,358 were malignancies and 6,200 were nonmalignants (with 737 classified as 
“other”).  For that five month period in 2005, the ratio of new nonmalignant to malignant claims 
had fallen to 2.65:1 versus 3:1 in 2004 and 9:1 in 2003. 
  Other trusts have experienced declines in the range of 25-35%.  For example, Celotex Trust 
claims declined 25% from 2003 to 2004 and the ratio of nonmalignant to malignant claims 
declined from 9:1 to 6.5:1.  See CELOTEX ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT TRUST, INTERIM CLAIMS 
REPORT (2005).  The H.K. Porter Asbestos Trust reported an estimated 32% decline in new claim 
filings for 2004 as compared to 2003.  The Eagle-Picher Trust reported that the ratio of 
nonmalignant to malignant claims for new filings in 2004 had fallen to approximately 5.8:1, 
down from 9:1 in each of the preceding three years.  Annual Report and Account of Ruth R. 
McMullen, et al., As Tr. of The Eagle-Picher Indus. Pers. Injury Settlement Trust, For the Year 
Ended Dec. 31, 2004, at 6-7, In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., No. 1-91-0010 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
Apr. 21, 2005).  Moreover, due to the decrease in claims filings and presumably because of an 
expectation that claim filings will decrease going forward, the Eagle-Picher Trust raised the 
percentage of claim values to be paid from 15.5% to 19.8%.  Id. at 10.  The Trust reported that the 
leading plaintiffs’ estimation expert had “performed an independent analysis and advised that the 
recommendation [to do so] was reasonable.”  Id.  Also concurring were the plaintiff lawyers on 
the Trust Advisory Committee.  Id.  In essence, all interested parties concurred in the expectation 
of a significant decline in future claims so as to justify raising the pay-out percentage.  Many of 
the leading defendants in the tort system have reported in their 2004 10K’s that they experienced 
declines averaging over 50% in new claim filings in 2004 compared to 2003, and declines 
averaging 59% in 2004 compared to 2001.   
  At a recent Mealey’s conference on asbestos litigation, Joe Rice, a leading plaintiffs’ 
attorney, in responding to discussion of whether the Manville Trust experience represented a 
“permanent decrease,” stated: “I think it is a permanent decrease.”  Joe Rice, Remarks at 
Mealey’s National Asbestos Litigation Conference (Sept. 20 2004) (participating in a panel 
discussion of “Recent Trends In Asbestos Claims Filings”).  Mr. Rice attributed the decline to a 
number of factors, including the Manville Trust adopting more stringent medical criteria and 
exposure requirements and bankruptcy courts adopting or considering adopting “trust distribution 
procedures” (TDP’s) with new medical and occupational exposure criteria, which will have the 
effect of eliminating substantial numbers of claims that claimants otherwise could have filed.  
(TDP’s prescribe the requisite medical and exposure criteria for filing claims with trusts created 
in bankruptcy proceeding to pay claimants.)  In addition, several of the recently adopted and 
currently proposed TDP’s include “collars” that will further limit the amount of the trusts’ assets 
available to pay most nonmalignant claims.  All of these factors combined are reducing the tort 
system value most nonmalignant claims can realize.  In the entrepreneurial claim generation 
process, decreased profitability of nonmalignant claims for plaintiffs’ lawyers results in fewer 
claims generated. 
  Even so, the CBO’s failure to take into account this decline in nonmalignant claiming is 
unlikely to appreciably affect the total dollar value of nonmalignant claims since, as the CBO 
further estimates, 85% of future nonmalignant claimants will be eligible only for a maximum of 
$1,000 in medical monitoring costs.  
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pay the claims of certain lung cancer claimants that were ultimately 
excluded from compensation under S. 852—though that sum has to be 
discounted for the reasons set forth.94 
After discussing the financial effects of omitting this claim 
category, I then consider the financial costs of S. 852 that are not 
included in the $140 billion Trust Fund figure, which should be added 
to that sum to gain a more accurate understanding of the cost of “fixing” 
asbestos litigation by adopting S. 852. 
 
B.     The Former “Level VII” Claimants 
 
Both S. 1125 and S. 2290 included a category, “Malignant Level 
VII,” which applied to claimants with a primary lung cancer who could 
produce evidence of substantial occupational exposure to asbestos and 
medical documentation establishing asbestos exposure as “a 
contributing factor” to the lung cancer (the “Former Level VII’s”).95  
Former Level VII’s were not required, however, to show that the 
asbestos exposure was “a substantial factor” in causing the lung cancer 
or, as many leading doctors believe is required to show that a smoker’s 
lung cancer was caused by asbestos exposure, the existence of an 
underlying asbestos-related condition such as asbestosis or pleural 
plaques.  Since over 150,000 lung cancers manifest annually,96 this 
provision generated considerable controversy because it threatened to 
make the FAIR Act into a smokers’ relief bill.  Ultimately, as explained 
by Senators Specter and Leahy, the Former Level VII’s category was 
deleted from S. 852: 
Some members raised concerns about compensating the so-called 
“exposure only” Level VII lung cancers, fearing that this disease 
category would create a “smokers” compensation fund.  Without 
sufficient markers to show a stronger causal connection between 
asbestos exposure and lung cancer, this disease category could have 
required $7 billion from the Fund.  After serious consideration, we 
removed this disease category from the bill.97 
Senators Specter and Leahy have thus valued the savings from the 
deletion of the Former Level VII claims at $7 billion.  However, no 
 
 94 The actual value of this deletion must be offset by the increased values for cancer claims.  
See infra note 98. 
 95 S. 1125 § 121(d)(7); S. 2290 § 121(d)(7).  The “contributing factor” standard requires a 
considerably lower level of proof than the “substantial factor” test.  See, e.g., McCloskey v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 460 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1983). 
 96 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Cntrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Lung 
Cancer Statistics, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/lung/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
 97 Letter from Senator Arlen Specter & Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 92, at 4 (emphasis 
added). 
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corresponding reduction was made in the aggregate amount of the Trust 
Fund.  Therefore, in effect, the cost of the Trust Fund was increased by 
up to $7 billion though a certain portion of the $7 billion was used to 
increase cancer claims values.98  
 
C.     Costs Outside the Trust Fund 
 
S. 852, as currently drafted, contains language preempting any 
federal or state law insofar as it may relate to an asbestos claim.99  It 
also, however, allows clear exceptions and “carve-outs” that, by 
themselves, will have a financial impact in addition to the $140 billion 
cost of the Trust Fund.  Consequently, any evaluation of the cost of 
“fixing” asbestos litigation by enacting S. 852 may not be limited to the 
$140 billion funding obligations within the Trust Fund since, as 
discussed below, S. 852 contemplates the payment of significant costs 
in addition to the $140 billion Trust Fund.100  In this essay, I examine 
five of these exceptions and carve outs, and their related financial 
impact: 
 
1.   asbestos claims handled and paid over the past thirty 
     months since S. 1125 was first discussed; 
2.   “exigent” claimants who qualify for special treatment under 
      S. 852; 
3.   subrogation and workers’ compensation claims; 
 
 98 The “price” for eliminating the Former Level VII category was an increase in the claim 
values for most cancer categories and the allowance of the routine use of CT (CAT) scans to 
establish claims for lung cancer with asbestosis (Level VIII).  S. 852 § 1212(d)(8).  CT scans are 
more sensitive than chest X-rays and so can detect more instances of asbestos-related conditions.  
In addition, no established medical criteria exists for evaluating whether a CT scan indicates the 
presence of asbestosis, whereas the International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted a 
significantly developed protocol for classifying chest X-rays.  Accordingly, there is a weaker 
basis for challenging a positive CT scan reading than a positive X-ray reading.  Thus, this 
provision allowing CT scans to be used will likely result in claimants filing more Level VII 
claims.  For an explanation of the ILO classification of chest X-rays, see Brickman, supra note 
23, at 47-48.  For consideration of the possible impact of funding “holiday” and “step-down” 
provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 81-82. 
 99 Sec. 403(a), “Effect on Federal and State Law,” states, “The provisions of the Act shall 
supersede any Federal or State law insofar as such law may relate to any asbestos claim, including 
any claim described under subsection (e)(2).”  S. 852 § 403(a).  An “asbestos claim” is a defined 
term under S. 852, which limits its application to injuries suffered by a person as the result of 
asbestos exposures; as such, it explicitly excludes, among other claims, “claims alleging damage 
or injury to tangible property.”  Id. § 3(3)(B)(i).   
 100 A number of other potentially significant costs of resolving asbestos claims exist, which I 
do not discuss in this essay.  For example, the costs associated with property damage caused by 
asbestos (such as claims seeking as a remedy the costs of removing asbestos from buildings) are 
excluded from coverage under S. 852, S. 852 § 3(3)(B)(i), and represent an additional and 
potentially significant cost outside the Trust Fund that certain trust participants must bear.   
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4.   pending lawsuits where evidence has commenced, lawsuits 
     where a final judgment has been entered, and certain 
     settlements; and 
5.   silica/mixed dust claims. 
 
1.     Claims Paid During the Legislative Process 
 
Additional costs of resolving personal injury asbestos litigation 
beyond the Trust Fund include payments made by defendants and 
insurers pursuant to judgments or settlements that were entered in the 
tort system during the more than two-year period in which Congress has 
been actively considering different iterations of the FAIR Act.101  In a 
letter to United States Senators dated June 27, 2005, a group of insurers, 
which described itself as holding over two-thirds of the net asbestos 
reserves as of December 2004 and as having paid nearly two-thirds of 
all asbestos claims, calculated that $9 billion had been paid in the thirty 
months since the Trust Fund was first proposed.102  Nonetheless, 
legislators have not elected to reduce proportionately the size of the 
Trust Fund to account for that $9 billion.  For those insurers and 
defendants that paid the $9 billion, their share of the amount to be paid 
into the Trust Fund has been effectively increased by $9 billion plus any 
additional monies they must pay out in settlements and judgments until 
such time as Congress actually passes S. 852.  Accordingly, even 
though this expense (or possibly a larger amount) would have been 
incurred in the tort system even if Congress had not been considering a 
proposal for a legislative “fix,” it is appropriate to add the $9 billion-
plus figure to the accounting of the cost of legislatively resolving 








 101 When the FAIR Act was initially proposed, it was assumed Congress would pass the bill in 
2003 and payments to claimants outside a Trust Fund would stop.  As such, 2002 data was used 
in establishing the size of the Trust Fund under S. 1125.  The Trust Fund amount was not adjusted 
downwards to reflect that claims continued to be paid while the FAIR Act was being considered. 
 102 Letter from Acuity, Allstate, Am. Int’l Group, Am. Re, The Chubb Corp., Erie Ins. Group, 
EMC Ins. Co., Gen. Re, The Hartford, Liberty Mutual, Nationwide, One Beacon, Royal Sun 
Alliance, Safeco Corp., Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., Winterthur N. Am. and Zurich to author 
(June 28, 2005) (on file with author).  For purposes of this analysis, I am accepting this amount as 
accurate. 
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2.     “Exigent Claimants” 
 
In order to address asbestos claims pending in the tort system while 
the Trust Fund administrative framework is being set up, the drafters 
authorized “exigent claimants” to seek payment both before and after S. 
852 is enacted.103  Living claimants with mesothelioma or with a life 
expectancy of less than one year (or the spouse or child of such a 
claimant if the claimant died since his or her claim was filed with the 
Trust Fund) are authorized to file “exigent health claims” under S. 
852.104  S. 852 provides that, if the Administrator fails to pay a claim 
that he or she has determined or certified as exigent, the claimant may 
seek a payment directly from a defendant identified as “an appropriate 
defendant in a civil action seeking damages for the asbestos claim of the 
claimant.”105  If the claimant and a defendant or defendants ultimately 
achieve an agreement, payment must be made within a prescribed time 
frame.  While the bill caps any such award at no greater than one-
hundred-fifty percent of the Trust Fund award value, if the claim is not 
settled, the claimant may pursue the claim in the tort system where no 
caps on the award or on attorney’s fees exist.106 
Under S. 852, settlement payments made by a defendant for 
exigent claimants are deducted from that defendant’s required annual 
contributions to the Trust Fund: 
Any defendant whose settlement offer is accepted may recover the 
cost of such settlement by deducting from the defendant’s next and 
subsequent contributions to the Fund the full amount of the payment 
made by such defendant to the exigent health claimant, unless the 
Administrator finds, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, 
that the defendant’s offer is not in good faith.107 
Nonetheless, here too, the drafters apparently have elected not to 
provide for any corresponding reduction in the $140 billion Trust Fund 
total.  While section 106(f) of the bill addresses the “exigent” claimant 
payment protocol, it does not provide that payments to exigent 
claimants will be deducted from, or offset against, the collective 
obligation.108  Thus, although payments to exigent claimants count 
 
 103 S. 852 § 106(f)(2)(A)(i). 
 104 Under section 106(c)(3), the Trust Fund Administrator may, in final regulations, designate 
additional categories of “exigent claimants” which can further expand the costs associated with 
such claims.   
 105 S. 852 § 106(f)(2)(A)(iii)(IV). 
 106 The exigent claim provisions are inordinately complex if not unfathomable; my analysis in 
this essay barely touches on most of the complexities.  
 107 S. 852 § 106(f)(2)(A)(xii)(I).  The section further provides that if there are not enough 
future payments to allow the defendant to recover its costs, it is entitled to reimbursement. 
 108 Section 106(f) does contain language that “[a]ny such payment [to a claimant] shall be 
considered a payment to the [Trust] Fund for purposes of section 404(e)(1) and in response to the 
payment obligations imposed on defendant and insurer participants in Title II,” but the intent 
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against particular defendants’ allocated shares, they do not appear to 
decrease the collective obligation of defendants, insurers, and 
bankruptcy trusts to pay in a total of $140 billion.  Thus, as S. 852 
currently reads, when one defendant/contributor offsets its next payment 
into the Trust Fund by the amount it paid to an exigent claimant, the 
other defendants and insurers paying into the Trust Fund will have to 
make up the amount of that offset.  Accordingly, exigent payments may 
constitute a cost to defendants and insurers in addition to the cost of the 
$140 billion Trust Fund.109 
To quantify the value of the exigent claimant exception, I have 
adopted the projections that the Congressional Budget Office (the CBO) 
provided on November 7, 2003 at the request of J. Dennis Hastert, the 
Speaker of the House, when S. 1125 was under consideration.  For its 
report, the CBO was asked to provide a forecast for pending and future 
malignant and nonmalignant claims by disease level and by year.  The 
CBO based its estimate for pending claims on research Navigant 
Consulting had conducted for use by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and various stakeholders during discussions of the Trust Fund.110  From 
these projections, I conclude that the financial impact of the exigent 
claims exception ranges from $7.7 billion to $11.0 billion.111  
 
behind this is unclear, particularly given the reference to insurers, who are not otherwise 
addressed elsewhere in section 106(f).  Id. § 106(f)(2)(A)(xii)(I). 
 109 It is theoretically possible that the collective obligation to pay in $140 billion will be 
reduced by exigent payments under the funding “holiday” and “step-down” provisions.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 81-82.  Moreover, the language I am interpreting is opaque and a 
construction different from the one I offer can be generated if one approaches the task with the 
view that exigent payments should not only offset participants’ payments but also count toward 
the annual payment target and ultimately the $140 billion total payment.  The interpretation I 
present is buttressed by the fact that, while it would be a simple drafting task to provide that 
exigent payments count towards the $140 billion total, the bill, as currently drafted, does not 
explicitly so provide.  
 110 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1125 FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY 
RESOLUTION ACT OF 2003. 
 111 The largest category of “exigent” claims is mesothelioma claimants, who are awarded 
$1,100,000 under S. 852.  S. 852 § 131(b)(1).  The CBO’s base-line estimate of pending 
mesothelioma claims totaled 7,040.  Multiplying 7,040 (the projected number of pending 
mesothelioma claimants) by the Trust Fund award value for mesothelioma claimants ($1.1 
million) yields $7.7 billion.  To this calculation should be added lung cancer claimants who could 
and probably will qualify as “exigents.”  Under S. 852, lung cancer claimants with asbestosis can 
be awarded between $600,000 and $1.1 million depending upon their smoking history; lung 
cancer claimants with “pleural disease” can be awarded between $200,000 and $800,000 
depending upon their smoking history.  The CBO projected approximately 2,522 pending claims 
of lung cancer with asbestosis and 3,837 claims of lung cancer with “pleural disease.”  Using a 
weighted average Trust Fund award value of $700,000 for a lung cancer claimant with asbestosis 
and $410,000 for a lung cancer claimant with pleural disease, the cost for both categories of lung 
cancer claimants approximates $3.3 billion.  (I multiplied $700,000 by 2,522, which equals 
$1.765 billion, and $410,000 by 3,837, which equals $1.5 billion, and then totaled both numbers.) 
  Ignoring other possible categories of “exigent” claims, the financial impact of the exigent 
claimant exception ranges from $7.7 billion to $11.0 billion, depending on whether one looks 
solely at mesothelioma claimants or also includes lung cancer claimants.  Moreover, this range 
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3.     Subrogation and Workers’ Compensation Claims 
 
The bill broadly frames its description of the claims that are to be 
channeled into the Trust Fund.  It defines “asbestos claim” to mean:  
Any claim, premised on any theory, allegation, or cause of action for 
damages or other relief presented in a civil action or bankruptcy 
proceeding, directly, indirectly, or derivatively arising out of, based 
on, or related to, in whole or part, the health effects of exposure to 
asbestos, including loss of consortium, wrongful death, and any 
derivative claim made by, or on behalf of, any exposed person or any 
representative, spouse, parent, child, or other relative of any exposed 
person.112 
While this language is expansive, the bill explicitly excepts from 
the Trust Fund claims for benefits under workers’ compensation laws 
and veterans’ benefits programs.113  As a matter of public policy, the 
drafters have also determined that workers’ compensation benefits may 
not be set off as collateral sources from payments made by the Trust 
Fund to workers injured by exposure to asbestos.114  Also, any workers’ 
compensation claim or claim under a life or health insurance policy 
filed by a claimant, who has also filed a claim with the Trust Fund, must 
be handled without regard to any recovery the claimant receives from 
the Trust Fund.115 
These provisions will require self-insured employers and insurers 
to make these payments in addition to their Trust Fund obligations.  
Moreover, none of these costs, which insurers and self-insuring 
defendants will incur outside of the Trust Fund, may be recouped 
because S. 852 precludes subrogation.116  Because injured workers may 
receive an award from the Trust Fund in addition to workers’ 
compensation (or like) benefits without any corresponding set-off 
 
does not take into account other claimants who may qualify as “exigents.”  But that variable is 
offset by the fact that I included all pending mesothelioma and lung cancer claimants in my 
projection.  On August 25, 2005, the CBO released its report regarding the cost estimate of S. 
852.  2005 CBO REPORT, supra note 93.  In forecasting the number of pending cases as of 
2006—the year the CBO assumed as the date of enactment—the CBO concluded that it should 
increase the projections it relied upon in 2003 by 7%.  Id.  I have not made that adjustment.  If I 
did, the costs associated with the “exigent claimants” would increase by approximately $0.5 
billion.  
 112 S. 852 § 3(3). 
 113 Id. § 3(3)(B)(ii).  In addition to property damage claims (discussed supra at notes 99-100), 
the Act also excludes claims under health, disability, and life insurance policies or plans, claims 
under collective bargaining agreements, and claims arising out of medical malpractice.  Id. § 
3(3)(B)(iii)-(v). 
 114 “In no case shall statutory benefits under workers’ compensation laws, special adjustments 
made under section 131(b)(3), occupational or total disability benefits under the Railroad 
Retirement Act (45 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) . . . and veterans’ benefits programs be deemed as 
collateral source compensation for purposes of this section.”  Id. § 134(b)(1). 
 115 Id. § 135(b). 
 116 By extinguishing any lien, section 135 precludes subrogation. 
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against the payor’s Trust Fund obligation,117 the numbers of workers’ 
compensation claims filed by those alleging asbestos-related injury 
sustained in the course of employment may be expected to increase.  
Accordingly, these increased costs that may be incurred for resolution 
of personal injury asbestos litigation in addition to the Trust Fund 
should be accounted for. 
The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (the 
NCCI)118 has analyzed the potential cost impact of the workers’ 
compensation provisions of the Act.119  The NCCI contends that once 
the disincentive to filing asbestos claims in the workers’ compensation 
system (i.e., subrogation) has been removed, the number of such claims 
will increase greatly, with tens of thousands of additional claims each 
year flooding the state workers’ compensation system.  Although it 
notes that estimating the costs of section 135 of the Act is challenging 
and uncertain, the NCCI projects substantial additional costs to the 
workers’ compensation system.  Using the CBO estimate of the 
expected number of claims to the Trust Fund over its life, assuming that 
five to ten percent of these claims are accepted and compromised as 
workers’ compensation claims, and applying countrywide costs-per-
claim statistics and annual inflation factors, the NCCI concludes that the 
Act’s ultimate cost impact to the state workers’ compensation systems 
will be $39 to $88 billion.120  
I have not attempted to independently assess the workers’ 
compensation claim costs that the NCCI has analyzed; doing so would 
require a state-by-state analysis of workers’ compensation programs121 
and a close examination of the NCCI’s methodology and analysis.  
 
 117 “The payment of an award to an asbestos claimant under section 106 or 133 shall not affect 
any claim of an asbestos claimant against—(1) an insurance carrier with respect to insurance; or 
(2) against any person or governmental entity with respect to worker’s compensation, healthcare, 
or disability.”  S. 852 § 135(b). 
 118 As described on its website, NCCI, which has operated since 1922 as a not-for-profit 
organization, “is the oldest and largest provider of workers compensation and employee injury 
data and statistics in the nation.”  It regularly analyzes workers’ compensation system cost trends 
and determines the overall financial impact of proposals and enacted legislation that affect the 
workers’ compensation system.  National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., 
http://www.ncci.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
 119 NAT’L COUNCIL ON COMP. INS., INC., ANALYSIS OF S.852 FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY 
RESOLUTION (FAIR) ACT OF 2005 (on file with author). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.12 (West 2005) (requiring claimants to notify employers 
within thirty days after the date of injury or the date “the employee knew or ought to have known 
the nature of his or her disability and its relation to the employment” and, regardless of notice, 
barring claims not filed within two years of such date unless “the employer knew or should have 
known, within the 2-year period, that the employee had sustained the injury on which the claim is 
based”); 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (West 2005) (barring claims not filed within two years); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-3-109 (West 2005) (barring claims not filed within six years, or in 
which the employee does not meet his or her burden of proof within twelve years, from the date 
the employee’s cause of action arose). 
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Nonetheless, a case has been made that these costs could be significant.  
Therefore, they should be added to the calculus of the costs that may be 
incurred for resolution of personal injury asbestos litigation, in addition 
to the cost of the Trust Fund, if S. 852 is enacted.   
 
4.     Pending Lawsuits Where Evidence Has Commenced, 
Lawsuits Where a Final Judgment Has Been 
Entered and Certain Settlements 
a.     Pending Law Suits 
 
Prior versions of the FAIR Act grappled with the question of how 
to treat cases already pending in the tort system at the time Congress 
passes the bill.  S. 1125 provided that the Act would preempt all 
pending court actions asserting asbestos claims, with a limited 
exception for cases where a judgment was entered that was no longer 
subject to appeal.122  Amendments offered by Senator Diane Feinstein, 
concerned with delay during the start-up period, would have preserved 
all cases in the tort system until the Administrator certified that the 
Fund was operational.  S. 2290 returned to the original concept of S. 
1125, excepting only cases with final judgments that were no longer 
appealable.  S. 852, however, creates a broader exemption for on-going 
lawsuits: if the presentation of evidence has commenced, the case is not 
preempted.  If, however, the jury has begun to deliberate, S. 852, as 
currently drafted, provides that the claim is preempted.123  Obviously, 
this latter outcome is inconsistent with the preemption provision and is 
 
 122 This exception was sound because once a plaintiff had a final, non-appealable judgment, a 
vested property right arose which, if disturbed by the legislation, would raise a legitimate 
constitutional challenge. 
 123 As set forth in section 403(d)(2)(A)(iii)(I), S. 852 excepts from its reach any individual 
jury trial in federal or state court, which “is before the jury after its impaneling and 
commencement of presentation of evidence, but before its deliberations.”  Section 
403(d)(2)(A)(iii)(II) includes an essentially parallel provision for cases where the judge serves as 
the trier of fact.  Section 403(d)(2)(A)(iii)(III) extends the exemption to apply to any claim where 
“a verdict or final order, or final judgment has been entered by a trial court.”  The previous 
versions of the FAIR Act limited the exemption to a final, non-appealable judgment.  By allowing 
cases with final judgments to be paid outside the Trust Fund, S. 852 eliminates the “no longer 
subject to appeal” standard that created vested property rights under S. 1125 and S. 2290.  A trial 
court judgment, standing alone, does not create such property rights.  In re U.S. Atmospheric 
Testing Litig. v. Livermore Labs, 820 F.2d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 
(1988).  “No person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall 
remain unchanged for his benefit . . . .  This is true after suit has been filed and continues to be 
true until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained.”  Id. (citing Hammond v. United States, 786 
F.2d 8, 12 (1986)).  It also bears noting that, even without a “rush to the courthouse” before 
passage of the Act, claimants who are able to secure trials and begin introducing evidence before 
the date Congress enacts the bill will be allowed to continue their claims within the very tort 
system that the Trust Fund is designed to replace. 
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probably an artifact of the extensive redrafting process. 
Quantifying the cost for pending cases where the presentation of 
evidence has commenced requires a series of increasingly problematic 
estimations.  As of the date Congress enacts S. 852, the number of trials 
that fall within this exception will be fixed.  The actual cost of this 
exception will take much longer to ascertain.  I am informed that 
asbestos trials average five to eight days in duration, though some go 
much longer.  It may easily take six months or more for all the trials in 
this category across the country to conclude.   
Calculating the cost of all trials in which the presentation of 
evidence is underway when Congress passes S. 852 requires, first, a 
determination of how many trials will fit within the exception.  The 
trials must be divided between those in which plaintiffs prevail and 
those that will result in defense outcomes.  Then, of those trials in which 
plaintiffs prevail, the percentage likely to go to verdict and the 
percentage likely to settle prior to verdict must be estimated.  For both 
plaintiffs’ verdicts and pre-verdict settlements, the calculations must 
take into account the nature of the claims, by disease, and the average 
verdict or settlement value of each such claim.  Looking at the likely 
dollar average for each verdict or settlement by disease, the total dollar 
range of all settlements and verdicts might then be projected.  The 
penultimate step in this analysis would be to factor in defense costs, 
since they too would be paid by the participants outside the Trust Fund.  
Defense costs would vary depending upon the number of defendants 
and whether the claims were resolved via settlement prior to verdict or 
not until after the trial concluded.  Finally, this figure must be offset by 
deducting a value assigned to those non-preempted trials that result in 
defendants’ verdicts. 
The foregoing analysis reveals that calculating the cost of the 
pending trials exception to preemption under S. 852 is inordinately 
complex.  While I am therefore not going to attempt to quantify these 
costs, it appears likely that this factor could result in participants 
incurring substantial tort system costs outside of the Trust Fund, 
particularly if these trials take a long time to resolve.  
 
b.     Settlements 
 
In addition to pending lawsuits, the treatment of settlements that 
were finalized prior to the enactment of S. 852 has been a subject of 
intense discussion through the various iterations of the FAIR Act.  The 
first version sought to except only those settlements that were 
definitively concluded.  S. 1125 preserved from its reach, and thereby 
required payments outside the Trust Fund for, those settlements already 
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approved by a court and having the status of a final judgment.  Proposed 
amendments would have excepted settlements and verdicts predating 
the Act.124  S. 2290 attempted to define finality as the completion of all 
acts called for in settlement agreements.  That version would have 
invalidated any settlements with any future performance remaining, 
including unmade payments, and channeled the asbestos claims into the 
Trust Fund. 
S. 852 takes a much larger step toward excepting settlements from 
the Trust Fund, with the result that if the bill passes, there will be claims 
paid—and therefore costs incurred—outside the Trust Fund.  While, on 
the one hand, S. 852 provides that any agreement concerning an 
asbestos claim and requiring future performance shall be superseded by 
the Act,125 it also creates an exception for certain settlements.126  
Specifically, a settlement agreement that 
is written, binding and legally enforceable, 
predates enactment, 
is made between a defendant or insurer and a specific named plaintiff 
(or plaintiff’s relatives or legal representative), and 
contains an express obligation by the defendant or insurer to make 
specified future payments 
is outside of S. 852, so long as “all conditions” to payment are fulfilled 
within thirty days after enactment.127  Where plaintiffs can claim that 
they have entered into or are covered by settlement agreements, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will have a substantial incentive to argue that “all 
conditions” have been met so that payment will be made outside the 
Trust Fund.  This is so because S. 852 caps contingency fees at five 
percent,128 whereas in the tort system, attorney’s fees generally are not 
capped and many if not most approximate forty percent of a claimant’s 
gross award.129  Plaintiffs’ counsel’s interests are obviously better 
served by having claims paid under the guise of a pre-Act settlement 
than by having them resolved under the Act.  It is unclear whether the 
Administrator will have either the tools or the incentive to examine in 
detail whether settlement payments claimed to be due are excepted from 
S. 852.  While here too, it is difficult to estimate the magnitude of this 
 
 124 Hanlon, supra note 41, at 20. 
 125 S. 852 § 403(c)(1)-(2). 
 126 Id. § 403(c)(3). 
 127 Id.  As an exception to the exception, this provision does not apply to settlements where the 
defendant is in bankruptcy.  Id. § 202(f).  Thus, the bill would not preserve settlements under 
Owens Corning’s National Settlement Program, even if they meet the conditions of section 
403(c)(3), because the company filed for bankruptcy.   
 128 Id. § 104(e). 
 129 RAND has estimated plaintiff attorney fees at approximately 34%.  RAND REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 102.  My own estimate is higher.  See Brickman, supra note 4, at 841-43. 
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cost, it nonetheless constitutes a cost additional to the $140 billion cost 
of the Trust Fund.  
 
c.     Offset for Prior Awards 
 
S. 852 requires a claimant to disclose any payment he or she has 
received for an asbestos claim in any prior action or claim, including 
settlement or judgment.130  Any previous payments to a claimant either 
under the Act or prior to the Act offset amounts to be paid under the 
Trust Fund.  If prior payments have exceeded the amount S. 852 sets 
forth for that disease category, no payment from the Trust Fund is 
allowed.  However, in order for the Trust Fund Administrator to offset 
any prior award payment from a Trust Fund award, the Administrator 
must be informed of such payment.  While anyone who willfully 
falsifies a claim by failing to disclose prior settlement proceeds received 
is subject to criminal penalties,131 the lesson of asbestos litigation is that 
where substantial sums are at stake, financial incentives tend to 
predominate over adherence to rules.132  The concern that claimants 
who have already received multiple settlements will nonetheless receive 
payment again under S. 852 is heightened by the fact that the only 
databases that would effectively allow the Trust Fund Administrator to 
identify undisclosed pre-Act settlement payments to a claimant are 
those maintained by plaintiffs’ law firms,133 and that S. 852 contains no 
 
 130 S. 852 § 113(c)(7). 
 131 Id. § 401(a). 
 132 For example, ethical rules regulating lawyers’ conduct have rarely been applied to asbestos 
litigation.  See Brickman, supra note 4, at 837-39.  In addition, there is at least circumstantial 
evidence that attorneys have submitted claims to asbestos bankruptcy trusts that include 
conflicting product exposure assertions.  See Brickman, supra note 23, at 74-76 n.120.  Judge 
Jack, in her Order in the Silica MDL, notes more hard evidence of the use of inconsistent work 
histories and false exposure claims.  She discusses two medical reports provided by Dr. Ray 
Harron for the same individual.  On one date, Dr. Harron “diagnosed” the litigant with silicosis, 
and on another date, with asbestosis.  In re Silica Prods. Liab. Lit., No. MDL 1553, 2005 WL 
1593936, at *30 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2005).  In the asbestos report, the litigant’s work history 
states that he worked for the U.S. Army as a laborer from 1957 to 1994, during which time he 
was exposed to asbestos.  In the silicosis report, the work history states only that he worked for 
the Ingalls Corporation as a painter from 1965 to 1968, where he was exposed to silica.  Id.  At 
least one of these work history claims is obviously a misstatement. 
 133 Except for the relatively rare occasions when trials go to verdict and judgment and require 
complex allocations of responsibility amongst settling and nonsettling defendants, defendants are 
generally unaware of how much a claimant or his representative has already received in 
settlement proceeds.  Thus, in the tort system, a claimant may already have already received 
twenty or thirty settlements (or more) at the time that a demand is made on a particular defendant.  
The aggregate amount the claimant receives may be multiples of the reasonable aggregate value 
of the claim in the tort system.  While plaintiff lawyers, of course, are aware of the aggregate 
amount of settlement proceeds their clients have received to that point, defendants generally are 
not only unaware of that amount but also unable to find out.  Attempts to discover this 
information in depositions often fail and, in any event, necessitate incurring the cost of taking 
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provision giving the Administrator authority to access those databases.  
A possible alternative database might be constructed by assembling the 
databases maintained by hundreds of defendants.  However, even if 
confidentiality issues could be overcome, many of these databases are 
incompatible, limiting the ability to combine them to produce aggregate 
data.  The inability to independently and accurately determine the prior 
amounts paid to claimants in the tort system is likely to result in 
unwarranted Trust Fund payments to these claimants.  While the 
magnitude of such excess payments cannot readily be estimated, these 
excess payments may be considered a cost of resolving personal injury 
asbestos litigation in addition to the Trust Fund cost set out in S. 852.   
 
5.     Silica 
 
A danger exists that the civil justice debacle occasioned by 
entrepreneurially-generated asbestos claims will be replicated with 
respect to silica claims.  Because of the unprecedented level of 
discovery permitted by Judge Jack in the silica MDL,134 the silica story 
has emerged as an even more clearly defined indictment of 
entrepreneurial claiming than is asbestos litigation. 
While occupational exposure to silicosis has had tragic 
consequences, strict government regulations enacted over the past fifty 
years have sharply reduced permissible exposures to silica.  As a 
consequence, deaths attributable to silicosis have declined steadily from 
1,157 deaths in 1968 to 187 deaths in 1999.  Consistent with this 
decline, only a handful of silicosis cases have presented at leading 
medical institutions in recent years.135  However, beginning in late 
2002, an “epidemic” of silicosis claim filings took place, mostly in state 
courts in Mississippi despite the fact that Mississippi’s silicosis 
mortality rate ranks forty-third out of the fifty states.136  Fortunately for 
American workers, the locus of this “phantom epidemic”137 was not in 
 
plaintiffs’ depositions. 
 134 See infra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.  
 135 From 1950 to 1979, for example, Massachusetts General Hospital reported only 15 cases of 
silicosis and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.  Theresa C. McLoud et al., Chronic Diffuse 
Infiltrative Lung Disease, 5(2) CLINICS IN CHEST MED. 329, 339 (1984).  From 1980 to 1987, the 
Mayo Clinic found only ten to twenty-five cases of silicosis per year from the approximately 
250,000 patients it sees annually.  RICHARD A. DEREMEE, CLINICAL PROFILES OF DIFFUSE 
INTERSTITIAL PULMONARY DISEASE 46 (1990).  Between the two periods of 1969 to 1981 and 
1982 to 2001, the death rate for silicosis had dropped 70%.  M.D. Attfield et al., Changing 
Patterns of Pneumoconiosis Mortality, United States, 1968-2000, 53(28) MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., July 23, 2004, at 627-32, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5328a1.htm. 
 136 In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *4.  
 137 Id. at *6. 
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workplaces but rather only in state courtrooms. 
The beginning of the legal “epidemic” of silicosis filings coincides 
with two developments that created the perception that the end game 
had begun with regard to nonmalignant, entrepreneurially-generated 
asbestos claims: (1) the onset of Congressional consideration of S. 1125 
in 2002-2003 that would have limited payment to only those asbestos 
claimants that could show actual injury;138 and (2) the adoption by a 
number of key states of tort reform legislation directly aimed at curbing 
the asbestos litigation abuses this essay describes as an integral part of 
the entrepreneurial model.139  As a consequence of these developments, 
some screening entities and plaintiff lawyers shifted their focus from 
screening for asbestosis to screening for silicosis. 
Approximately 10,000 of the approximately 35,000 silicosis claims 
recently filed, mostly in Mississippi and Texas state courts, were 
centralized into an MDL proceeding presided over by U.S. District 
Court Judge Janis Jack, which began on September 4, 2003.140  Of these 
10,000 claims, twelve doctors accounted for over 9,000 of the 
diagnoses.  In October 2004, defendants deposed one of these doctors, 
Dr. George Martindale, who had diagnosed 3,617 of the plaintiffs as 
having silicosis.  Dr. Martindale recanted all of his diagnoses, testifying 
that he did not even know the criteria for making a diagnosis of 
silicosis.141  In reaction to this extraordinary event, Judge Jack observed 
that “it’s clear this Martindale business is fraudulent,”142 and issued the 
unprecedented order that every physician who had diagnosed silicosis in 
any of the plaintiffs had to be available to testify at a Daubert143 
hearing; moreover, Judge Jack provided that defendants could depose 
B-readers, diagnosing doctors, and screening enterprise principals in 
open court under her direct supervision, thus precluding such witnesses 
from refusing to answer questions for unsustainable reasons and turn 
over subpoenaed documents as often occurs in asbestos litigation 
depositions.144 
 
 138 See Hearings on Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (written Statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law) (quoting Heath Mason, the co-owner of N&M, Inc., who 
testified that the reason his company changed from asbestos to silica screening is because of the 
“Hatch Bill”).  
 139 Id. at *45 (“[M]ost of the [silicosis] cases were filed just prior to the effective dates of a 
series of recent legislative ‘tort reform’ measures in Mississippi.”).   
 140 See In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *6. 
 141 Id. at *11. 
 142 Transcript of Dec. 17, 2004 Status Conference at 36, In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 
1593936. 
 143 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
 144 Prior to the “Daubert” hearing, two more depositions took place: Drs. Glynn Hilbrun and 
Kevin Cooper.  Both doctors also recanted the medical diagnoses of silicosis they had signed, 
stating that they had not diagnosed any of the plaintiffs with silicosis.  See In re Silica Prods., 
2005 WL 1593936, at *17. 
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A study done by the defendants in the silicosis MDL showed that 
sixty percent of the claimants had previously filed asbestos claims with 
the Manville Trust.145  From the testimony presented, retreading these 
asbestosis claims as silicosis claims appears to have been a quite simple 
process: B-readers reread the X-rays, previously read as consistent with 
1/0 asbestosis, as consistent with 1/0 silicosis (even though silicosis and 
asbestosis manifest differently on X-rays).  Judge Jack euphemistically 
referred to this as “the opportunistic transformations of asbestosis reads 
into silicosis reads . . . .”146  Often, these new readings were performed 
by the same B-readers who originally read the X-rays as 1/0 asbestosis.  
In rereading the same X-rays as “consistent with silicosis,” these B-
readers do not mention their prior reading of the X-rays as indicating 
lung conditions “consistent with asbestosis.”  Moreover, in current 
screenings, B-readers commonly read an X-ray, fill out one ILO form as 
1/0 asbestosis, and at the same time fill out a second ILO form as 1/0 
silicosis. 
In retreading asbestosis claims, plaintiffs’ counsel were asserting 
that their claimants had both asbestosis and silicosis.  At the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing at which I testified, medical experts on 
lung diseases testified that, while it was theoretically possible for 
someone to have both asbestosis and silicosis, it would be a “clinical 
rarity.”147  Indeed several doctors testified that in their clinical 
experience, they had never seen a case where someone presented with 
both asbestosis and silicosis.  Yet appearing before Judge Jack were 
thousands of plaintiffs claiming to have both asbestosis and silicosis.  
This is undoubtedly also true for the tens of thousands of silicosis 
claims that were not part of the MDL. 
In response to the incredible testimony being presented in her 
presence, Judge Jack observed on several occasions that it appeared that 
fraudulent diagnoses had been produced.  On one occasion, she declared 
from the bench that it was “a reasonable assumption” that the testimony 
of one B-reader raised “great red flags of fraud.”148   
Indeed, defendants in the MDL proceeding presented 
overwhelming evidence that, in Judge Jack’s words, the silicosis 
“epidemic” “is largely the result of misdiagnosis,”149 and that “the 
lawyers, doctors and screening companies were all willing participants” 
 
 145 Hearings on Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (2005) (written Statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Get Weapon in Injury Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at C1.   
 146 In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *54. 
 147 Id. at *23. 
 148 Transcript of Feb. 17, 2005 Daubert Hearing at 23, In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936. 
 149 In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *143.   
  
2005] ANALYSIS OF S .  852  1027 
in a “scheme” to “manufacture[] [diagnoses] for money.”150   
Despite the overwhelming nature of the inculpatory evidence 
produced in the course of the silica MDL proceeding, it is critically 
important to note that the only reason this information has ever seen the 
light of day is that Judge Jack did what no judge had ever previously 
done with regard to claims generated by mass screenings: she permitted 
extensive discovery of screening enterprise principals and B-readers.  
Based upon my study of asbestos litigation, it appears quite likely that 
permitting the same level of discovery in asbestos litigation would elicit 
similar inculpatory information regarding similarly supported 
nonmalignant asbestos claims generated by mass screenings—claims 
that have resulted in billions of dollars in settlements.151 
Mass screenings by the same screening enterprises using the same 
B-readers and diagnosing doctors have been the hallmark of asbestos 
litigation for almost twenty years.  Thus, the silica MDL proceeding’s 
importance extends well beyond silicosis litigation.  As Judge Jack 
observed, the “evidence of the unreliability of the B-reads performed for 
this MDL is matched by evidence of the unreliability of B-reads in 
asbestos litigation.”152  Journalists have also noted the relevance of the 
silica MDL proceeding to nonmalignant asbestos litigation.153 
While Judge Jack has corroborated many of the conclusions I have 
reached in the course of my study of asbestos litigation,154 it is 
 
 150 Id. at *150.   
 151 But for Judge Jack’s rulings, the 10,000 claims that were consolidated before her for pre-
trial purposes may have generated tens of millions of dollars in settlements, even though those 
claims were mostly if not entirely based on “diagnoses manufactured for money.”  As one 
newspaper has reported: 
In April 2004, a member of the plaintiffs’ team wrote lawyers for the 250-plus 
defendant companies that the 10,000-person lawsuit could be settled for an average of 
$100,000 per plaintiff, or a total of about $1 billion . . . [and] that if they didn’t settle, 
they’d spend more than $1.5 billion taking deposition testimony from plaintiffs, 
doctors and others and covering costs incurred during preparation of an eventual trial 
or trials.  And that sum didn’t include the damages that the plaintiffs’ lawyers expected 
to win at trial. 
Eddie Curran, Judge Torches’ Silicosis Testing, MOBILE REG., July 31, 2005, at 1A.  Moreover, 
there is no assurance, despite Judge Jack’s findings, that these silica claims will be appropriately 
dealt with by Mississippi state courts.  
 152 In re Silica Prods., 2005 WL 1593936, at *54. 
 153 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Civil Suits Over Silica in Texas Became a Criminal Matter in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at C5 (stating that the testimony in the MDL proceeding 
“may have cast doubt on claims, many of them already paid, that were filed in the past over 
asbestos-related disease”); Roger Parloff, Diagnosing For Dollars, FORTUNE, June 13, 2005, at 
97-98.  Roger Parloff writes: 
The real importance of . . . [the silica MDL] proceedings, however, is not what they 
reveal about possible fraud in silica litigation but what they suggest about a possible 
fraud of vastly greater dimensions.  It’s one that may have been afflicting asbestos 
litigation for almost 20 years, resulting in billions of dollars of payments to claimants 
who weren’t sick and to the attorneys who represented them. 
Id. 
 154 See Brickman, supra note 23. 
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important to note that her scathing indictment of entrepreneurial claim 
generation was largely advisory in nature and that there is no national 
moratorium on filing bogus silica claims.  Because she determined that 
most of the state cases had been improperly removed to federal court 
and she therefore lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction, she 
remanded the great majority of the cases to state court.  It is now up to 
state court judges to determine whether they will allow the tens of 
thousands of bogus claims to proceed and whether a plaintiffs’ lawyer’s 
demand for a $1 billion settlement155 will have to be met.  A state MDL 
proceeding currently underway in Houston, Texas does not auger well 
for the civil justice system’s ability to reject massive numbers of 
specious claims.156 
S. 852’s treatment of silica claims does not resolve the issue of 
claimants filing massive numbers of bogus silica claims in state courts.  
In particular, in the context of silica litigation, creating a mechanism to 
serve as the exclusive remedy for resolving asbestos claims presents 
two distinct problems. 
First, as already noted, plaintiffs’ lawyers are retreading asbestos 
claims as silica claims.  Second, a potential exists for bypassing the 
Trust Fund altogether by characterizing asbestos claims in the first 
instance as “silica” claims so that the plaintiffs can enter the tort system 
and thereby avoid the Trust Fund’s limitations (especially for 
unimpaired claimants).  Earlier drafts of S. 852 addressed the problem 
head-on, requiring a silica plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not only that he or she was functionally impaired, but that the 
impairment was caused by silica exposure and that asbestos exposure 
was not a significant contributing factor.  If a plaintiff failed to make the 
required showing, the Act would preempt his or her silica claim.157 
 In its present form, S. 852 has diluted this silica provision, 
allowing both retreads and bypass silica claims.  Thus, two ways now 
exist to avoid preemption of silica claims under section 403(b)(1).  
Under the first alternative, a claimant can bypass S. 852 by showing that 
his or her claim is a new claim, that he or she has not previously 
asserted a claim for an asbestos-related condition,158 and that he or she 
is not eligible for “any monetary award under this Act.”159  Because the 
current version of S. 852 eliminates the earlier requirement that a silica 
plaintiff had the burden to prove that he or she had insufficient asbestos 
 
 155 See supra note 151. 
 156 See Transcript of Status Conference, In re Texas State Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2004-
700000 (Dist. Ct. Harris County, Tex. June 27, 2005). 
 157 See S. 852, 109th Cong. § 403(b) (discussion draft, Feb. 7, 2005). 
 158 S. 852 does not contemplate the possibility of a new silica claimant obtaining a recovery in 
the tort system and then seeking compensation under S. 852.  No provision would appear to 
preclude this possibility. 
 159 S. 852 § 403(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2005). 
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exposure to be eligible for compensation under the Act, plaintiffs who 
qualify under Level I—essentially the entrepreneurially-generated 
“unimpaired” claimants—may, under this alternative, file silica claims 
in the tort system, provided they have not previously filed any asbestos-
based claim (whether for workers’ compensation, in the tort system, or 
under the Trust Fund).160  A claimant who qualifies for a Trust Fund 
award other than a Level I award, even one who has never filed an 
asbestos claim, cannot qualify under this exception from preemption.   
The alternative proof required of a silica plaintiff under the second 
option applies only to those plaintiffs who have previously filed an 
asbestos claim and who allege that they have suffered a functional 
impairment (unlike Level I claimants, who do not so allege).  These 
retreaded asbestos plaintiffs must show that silica exposure caused their 
impairment and that asbestos exposure was not “a substantial 
contributing factor” to that impairment.161  The Act thus bars a retreaded 
unimpaired silica claimant from recovery.  Although most silica 
claimants in the tort system have not heretofore claimed impairment, if 
S. 852 is enacted in its current form, that can be expected to change.162  
This creates a broad opening for the entrepreneurial asbestos claims 
mills to continue, albeit under the guise of “silica” claims.  Indeed, 
meeting these current requirements in S. 852 appears to be quite simple.  
The same litigation doctors who “diagnosed” the existence of an 
asbestos-related disease to a degree of medical certainty in tens of 
thousands of claimants will simply add one word to their “diagnoses” 
and conclude to a degree of medical certainty that asbestos exposure 
was “not a substantial contributing factor” to any lung impairment 
claimed to be caused by silica exposure.163  Thus, S. 852’s redrafted 
 
 160 S. 852 contains a possible ambiguity with respect to the effect of a Level I medical 
monitoring claim on the right to file a silica claim in the tort system.  S. 852 allows a claimant to 
bypass the Trust Fund, inter alia, if the claimant is not eligible for a “monetary award under this 
Act.”  Id.  A payment to reimburse a claimant for the expense of periodic medical examinations 
beyond the costs covered by insurance may be seen as a reimbursement rather than a “monetary 
award” like the awards paid to Level II through VIII claimants.  If that interpretation prevails, 
claimants eligible for Level I reimbursements would not be preempted under § 403(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) 
from bringing a silica claim in the tort system.  
 161 S. 852 § 403(b)(1)(A)(i)(II).  Section 403(b)(2)(B) sets forth the documentary requirement. 
 162 Screening companies have a considerable history of misadministering pulmonary function 
tests to generate false findings of lung impairment in asbestos litigation.  See Brickman, supra 
note 23, at 111-28. 
 163 To those who express skepticism about the likelihood of such an occurrence, I cite the 
remarkable interchange between Judge Janis Jack and Richard Laminack of the law firm of 
O’Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle in the silica MDL.  Laminack, whose firm represents approximately 
100 mostly retreaded asbestosis claimants who now claim silicosis, apparently seeking both to 
separate his clients from the fraudulent diagnosing racket Judge Jack identified in her Order and 
to overcome damning medical evidence that the incidence of such dual disease is a “‘clinical 
rarity,’” argues that he doubts that his clients “‘actually had asbestosis’” and further doubts that 
“‘they had [valid] claims [of] asbestosis.’”  Jack The Ripper, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2005, at A8.  
Ergo, he asserts that, although many of his clients previously obtained settlements of their 
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language will allow claimants to file retreaded asbestos claims as silica 
claims in the tort system, and that litigation will create substantial costs 
in addition to the $140 billion to be paid into the Trust Fund.164 
Ironically, the silica claims “epidemic” is a direct consequence of 
plaintiff lawyers’ attempts to avoid the consequences of S. 852 and its 
immediate predecessors by finding an alternative use for the very 
effective entrepreneurial claims generation process.  As one plaintiff 
lawyer has observed, “why reinvent the wheel”?165 
Predicting the number and cost of bogus silica claims is inherently 
uncertain.  As noted, plaintiffs’ counsel sought $1 billion to settle the 
10,000 silica claims in the federal MDL proceeding.166  Whether the 
cost of silica litigation is $10 million or $10 billion remains to be seen.  
What is reasonably clear, however, is that a best estimate of this cost 
should be included in toting up the effective cost of resolving asbestos 
litigation by adoption of S. 852. 
 
D.     Certification and Sunset: The Beginning and the End 
of the Trust Fund 
1.     Certification of the Trust Fund 
 
Once Congress enacts the FAIR Act of 2005, no claimant may 
maintain a pending asbestos claim unless it falls within the exceptions 
or carve-outs cited above.167  While, on its face, S. 852 appears to stay 
the remaining claims, the stay is, in fact, dependent upon certain 
conditions.  The Act charges the Trust Fund Administrator with 
certifying to Congress that the Trust Fund “is operational and paying all 
 
asbestos claims, they are, in fact, single-disease claimants because those asbestos claims were not 
legitimate.  One powerful antidote to the recent “epidemic” of silica claims, see supra notes 136-
137 and accompanying text, and to any mass “re-diagnosis” of asbestos claims, could be provided 
by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, which has been bringing 
some of those involved in the silica “scheme” that Judge Jack identified before a federal grand 
jury.  If that office issues indictments, entrepreneurial silica claim generation would probably 
largely cease, at least until the outcome of the indictments became clear.  See supra note 7.  
 164 Though the impetus to generate silica claims arises in part from the possible adoption by 
Congress of an administrative alternative to asbestos litigation, even if S. 852 is not adopted, 
silica claims would remain a tort system cost to be borne by defendants and their insurers.  
Nonetheless, I have chosen to consider the cost of these silica claims as additional to the $140 
billion Trust Fund because the silica provision previously included in the bill had largely 
precluded these claims.  See supra note 157.   
 165 Hearings on Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (2005) (written Statement of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law). 
 166 See supra note 151. 
 167 S. 852, 109th Cong. § 403(e)(1). 
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valid claims at a reasonable rate.”168  If the Administrator cannot make 
this certification within nine months of enactment, the stay is lifted for 
“exigent” claims, notwithstanding the Act’s already built-in special 
expedited mechanism for paying exigent claimants.169  For non-exigent 
claimants, the stay is lifted if the Administrator cannot make the 
certification within twenty-four months of enactment.  If the Trust Fund 
is not certified, claimants are then permitted to bring their claims as 
civil lawsuits in the tort system. 
For participants, the risk of failed certification is losing the sums 
they have already paid to the Trust Fund that may not be recouped.  S. 
852 does not address the disposition of amounts already contributed to 
the Trust Fund if certification does not occur; this omission raises the 
legitimate specter of participants incurring considerable costs pre-
certification and then having to pay again in the tort system.  Under S. 
852’s funding mechanism, this burden falls squarely on the participants 
who are required to pay approximately $6 billion in year one before the 
certification of exigent claims, and who are required to pay an 
additional $6 billion in year two before the non-exigent claims have 
been certified.  An early demise of the Trust Fund would therefore have 
a substantial negative financial impact on those paying into the Trust 
Fund. 
 
2.     Sunset 
 
S. 852’s sunset provisions raise a similar and equally costly 
concern.  The Act charges the Administrator with submitting an annual 
report to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees addressing the 
Trust Fund’s operation during the previous year.  If, on the basis of the 
information in the report, the Administrator concludes that the Trust 
Fund may not be able to pay claims as they become due within the next 
five years, he or she must present reasonable alternatives for responding 
to the situation and recommend the best alternative for the claimants 
and public.170  One alternative is terminating the Act. 
S. 852 provides for the sunset of the Act 180 days after a 
determination by the Administrator that the Trust Fund will not have 
sufficient resources to pay all resolved claims while meeting its other 
financial obligations.171  Although the stay of litigation is then lifted, the 
 
 168 Id. § 106(f)(3)(A).  The Administrator cannot make such certification until sixty days after 
the defendants’ funding allocation information and the insurers’ required reserves information are 
each published in the Federal Register.  Id. § 106(f)(3)(E). 
 169 See discussion of exigent claimants supra Section V.C.2. 
 170 S. 852 § 405(e)(1)(A). 
 171 Id. § 405(f). 
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Act requires participants to continue making payments to the Trust 
Fund.172  Claims already filed with the Trust Fund, but not resolved at 
the time of termination (so-called “sunset claims”), may be brought as 
civil actions in the tort system. 
At least one commentator has raised the prospect that the 
plaintiffs’ trial bar might flood the Trust Fund with claims in one year to 
overwhelm it, thus seeking to use the sunset provision as a means to 
terminate the Act.173  Changes made since S. 1125 have given the Trust 
Fund Administrator a longer financial view, more flexibility, and a 
range of options to address the Trust Fund’s financial distress; 
consequently, sunsetting is no longer automatic.  Still, the possibility of 
sunsetting in any given year, with its concomitant costs in the tort 
system, when combined with sums the participants already will have 
paid into the Trust Fund, is yet another factor to be accounted for in 
determining the potential costs of resolving personal injury asbestos 
litigation that are additional to the payments into the Trust Fund.  
The sunset provision has been problematic since it appeared in S. 
1125.  It challenges the principles of certainty and exclusivity that have 
been cited in support of the Act.  For participants, the potential for 
sunsetting threatens loss of their considerable investment in the Trust 
Fund without the expected resolution of all asbestos claims.  As 
Senators Kyl, Grassley, and Sessions stated, “[u]nder the sunset 
amendment, defendants and insurers could pay into the fund for five 
years, for a total of $25 billion . . . , and then, in year six, if claims 
exceed funds, the whole system would be scrapped and everyone would 
be back where they started—but minus $25 billion.”174  While the 
sponsors of S. 852 argue that sunset “should not occur before there is an 
extensive and rigorous ‘program review,’”175 its possibility merits 
identification as bearing upon the potential financial impact of resolving 




While many of the asbestos-related costs in the tort system will be 
folded into the $140 billion Trust Fund if S. 852 is enacted, defendants 
and insurers may incur some additional costs.  As my analysis shows, 
the financial impact of S. 852 is not static; it has several significant 
 
 172 The Administrator may reduce participant payments if he or she concludes that the full 
amounts are not necessary for the Trust Fund to pay the claims that have been resolved as of 
termination.  Id. § 405(f)(5). 
 173 See Hanlon, supra note 41, at 19. 
 174 S. REP. NO. 108-118, at 6 (2003). 
 175 Letter from Senator Arlen Specter & Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 92, at 5.   
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components, each of which must be quantified or, at a minimum, 
recognized, when toting up the costs that may be incurred for resolution 
of personal injury asbestos claims if Congress enacts S. 852.  To recap, 
my analysis considered the following: 
$140 billion to fund the Trust Fund; 
$9 billion for claims paid during the thirty-month legislative process, 
plus additional sums for whatever additional time passes before S. 
852 is enacted; 
$7.7-$11.0 billion for “exigent” claimants; and 
$20-$40 billion for newly filed workers’ compensation claims.176 
 Considering only the quantified costs, my analysis indicates that 
the costs that defendants and insurers may incur for resolution of 
personal injury asbestos claims, in addition to the $140 billion to be 
paid into the Trust Fund, could range from approximately $37 billion to 
$60 billion.  To this figure should be added the cost of four other 
exceptions that will impose costs outside the Trust Fund, which I have 
not quantified: (i) trial court verdicts; (ii) cases where the presentation 
of evidence has commenced; (iii) certain settlements; and (iv) silica 
claims.  Each will add unspecified sums to the cost of resolving 
personal injury asbestos litigation. 
The assumptions I have made in quantifying costs, and my reliance 
on reports and studies that I have not attempted to validate, may 
generate outcomes that are too high or too low.  I have set out these 
costs and acknowledged my inability to quantify certain other costs, 
however, as an invitation to undertake a similar calculus to those 
seeking to meaningfully compare the costs of the tort and bankruptcy 
systems (which I have not attempted to quantify177) with the costs that 
may be incurred for resolution of personal injury asbestos claims if S. 
852 is enacted.  
 
 
 176 As noted, NCCI has estimated that self-insured employers and insurers will experience 
additional costs of $39 to $88 billion if Congress enacts S. 852.  See supra notes 118-120 and 
accompanying text.  For purposes of this essay, I have arbitrarily discounted the NCCI estimate 
by approximately 50%.  In doing so, I do not mean to express any view as to the soundness of 
NCCI’s estimates or its methodology.  Moreover, as noted above, see supra text following note 
120, I have not attempted to independently assess the cost effect of precluding recovery of 
workers’ compensation awards from the Trust Fund.  S. 852 §§ 134(b)(1), 135(b). 
   177 As noted, structural changes in the tort system, changes in the Manville Trust’s TDP as well 
as in TDP’s currently being adopted and considered for adoption  (as compared to those of the 
older bankruptcy trusts) and Judge Jack’s determinations in the silica MDL have combined to 
significantly decrease the volume of nonmalignant claim filings.  Perhaps the most significant 
impact of all, however, would be realized if the federal grand jury convened by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, issues indictments of screening 
company employees and principals, doctors, and lawyers involved in the entrepreneurial 
generation of nonmalignant asbestos claims.  See supra note 163. 
 
